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IMPLIED LIMITATIONS ON THE
JURISDICTION OF INDIAN TRIBES
Richard B. Collins*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1978 the Supreme Court in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
held that the retained sovereignty of Indian tribes over tribal reservations does not include the power to punish non-Indians who commit
offenses against tribal law.' Based on a number of facts and premises,
the Court concluded that it had been assumed from the beginning that
the tribes lack this authority except where expressly recognized or
conferred by treaty provision or act of Congress.2 The Court also relied on the fact that during the formative years3 few Indian tribes had
the governmental structure necessary to comply with Anglo-American
4
requirements of due process of law.
This article reviews the Oliphantdecision and discusses the authority of Indian tribes to make and enforce civil laws applicable to nonIndians 5 within tribal Indian country. The Court's analysis in Oli* Staff attorney, Native American Rights Fund; Lecturer, University of Colorado
School of Law; B.A., 1960, Yale University; LL.B., 1966, Harvard University.
Copyright 1979, Richard B. Collins.
1. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
2. Id. The Supreme Court has sustained the power of Congress to delegate jurisdiction to Indian tribes. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-58 (1975). The Oliphant Court interpreted some treaty provisions providing for tribal punishment of illegal settlers as federal recognition of this power. See notes 94-96 and accompanying text
infra.
3. This phrase as a reference to the years in which basic federal Indian policy was
established was made popular by F. PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE
FORMATIVE YEARS (1962).

4. 435 U.S. at 196.
5. The Oliphant Court stated the issue presented as tribal criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians, rather than over nonmembers of the Suquamish Tribe. Id. at 195. But the
Court's opinion in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), described the Oliphant holding as applying to nonmembers of the tribe. 435 U.S. at 326. Because of this
discrepancy between contemporaneous opinions, and because the Oliphant defendants
were in fact whites, the question of tribal criminal jurisdiction over Indians who belong
to other tribes was not determined by Oliphant.Prior authority indirectly supports jurisdiction over nonmember Indians. E.g., 25 C.F.R. § 11.2(c) (1978); United States v. Burland, 441 F.2d 1199, 1200 n.1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 842 (1971); Arizona ex
rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1003 (1970).
The treatment of whites who became adopted members of some tribes during the 19th
century is discussed in notes 135-49 and accompanying text infra. Because the Court in
Oliphant posed the issue as jurisdiction over non-Indians, and because federal law has
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phant has already become the focus for lower court decisions dealing
with the scope of tribal jurisdiction. 6 In the following discussion, the
tribal claim to authority in noncriminal matters and the opposing
view that the Oliphant rationale should be extended to all forms of tri7
bal authority are evaluated.
A.

Retained Tribal Sovereignty

The background for the Court's decision in Oliphant was the wellestablished doctrine that when Indian tribes became subject to the authority of the United States, they nevertheless retained substantial
powers of self-government. 8 A number of diverse precedents contributed to this rule,9 but its survival in our law is most directly attributable
to the decisions of the Supreme Court during the tenure of Chief Justice John Marshall. In three opinions written between 1823 and
1832,10 Marshall articulated the concepts and vocabulary that have
defined the legal status of Indian tribes to this day.
usually made that the relevant category, the discussion in this article does the same
except where noted.
6. E.g., Trans-Canada Enterprises, Ltd. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, No. C77882M (W. D. Wash., Nov. 3, 1978); Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement &
Power Dist. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, No. 78-352 (D. Ariz.. July II, 1978).
7. At times attempts have been made to determine what authority Indian tribes
have by arguments about the meaning of the legal term "sovereignty." See, e.g., Martone, American Indian Tribal Self-Government in the Federal System: Inherent Right
or Congressional License?, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 600 (1976). This approach confuses
two distinct uses of the term. In international law a sovereign has the full range of powers of a nation state, and these powers collectively comprise its sovereignty. American
Indian tribes are not full sovereigns in that sense. It is also common in the United States
to refer to the states as sovereigns, although they do not fit the international law definition either. What we mean in the latter case is that the states exercise substantial.
independent authority within the American constitutional system. Indian tribes do also,
so the term in the latter sense is properly applied to them. Supreme Court opinions have
implicitly reflected this analysis. The Court has referred to tribes as "quasi-sovereign,'"
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974); the Court has also described the powers
tribes exercise as "retained tribal sovereignty," United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
324 (1978). Cases like Oliphant turn on how much sovereignty the tribes retain, so
semantic debates about the word largely beg the question. As the Court stated in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973): "The Indian. sovereignty doctrine
is relevant, then, not because it provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit.
but because it provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read." Id. at 172.
8. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978); see also note 20 and accompanying text infra.
9. The most significant practice was entering into treaties with many tribes implying that the tribes were independent states capable of making them. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-60(1832).
10. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
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Limits on Tribal Jurisdiction
First, the Marshall Court established that the Constitution delegated paramount authority over Indian matters to the national government. 11 Thus, federal treaties with Indian tribes and statutes regulating Indian matters prevail over state laws. This rule on allocation
of power survived later Courts less generous to federal authority 12 and
13
has been consistently followed.
Second, the Marshall Court described the tribes' status in relation
to the United States as a dependent one, based on the common treaty
provision that the tribe placed itself under the protection of the
United States "and of no other sovereign whatsoever. 14 This dependency has several important consequences. The Court held that the
11. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559, 561 (1832). As the Court there
stated, the previous allocation of authority had been uncertain because of ambiguous
wording in the Articles of Confederation.
12. Modern decisions of the Court hold that the federal power over commerce with
the Indian tribes, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and the treaty power, id. art. II, § 2, cl.2,
are the most important sources of federal authority over Indian affairs. United States v.
Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 554 (1975); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S.
164, 172 n.7 (1973). But many federal statutes on Indian matters do not fit ordinary notions of commerce, particularly as "commerce" was construed before the middle of the
twentieth century. For this reason the Court in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,
378-79 (1886), in sustaining a federal criminal statute dealing with offenses committed
on Indian reservations, declined to rely on the Indian commerce power and based its
decision on federal guardianship over Indian tribes. The Kagama Court referred to the
duty of protection assumed by the United States in treaties, see note 14 and accompanying text supra, but there was no treaty with the tribe involved in the case. The better
view is that of Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832), that the commerce clause and the treaty clause when read in light of the early history of relations with Indians (particularly the pre-1789 treaties) manifest a general intent to invest the federal government with plenary authority over Indian affairs.
On the other hand, the Court has rejected the argument that the Indian commerce
clause alone precludes all state authority. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 481 n. 17 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S.
164, 172 (1973). Rather, under the supremacy clause, U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl.2, federal
statutes (as well as treaties) preempt state laws which interfere with federal Indian policies. Id.; see also note 224 infra. Certain matters may be preempted by the Constitution
alone. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974); Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
13. E.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219 (1959). The Supreme Court has never
held a federal Indian statute or treaty to be an unconstitutional invasion of state authority, and on several occasions it has reversed contrary holdings of lower courts. E.g.,
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
14. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 551-52, 555 (1832) (quoting one of
the Cherokee treaties). Later treaties, including that at issue in Oliphant, included language acknowledging the tribe's "dependence on the government of the United States."
435 U.S. at 207. In others the tribes acknowledged the "supremacy" of the United
States. E.g., Treaty with the Cheyenne Tribe, July 6, 1825, art. 1, 7 Stat. 255, 255. Some
treaties, for example, the important Treaty of Greeneville, included no such terms.
Treaty with the Wyandot and Other Indian Tribes, Aug. 3, 1795, 7 Stat. 49 (Treaty of
Greeneville).

481

Washington Law Review

Vol. 54:479, 1979

general practice of European sovereigns to monopolize land acquisitions from the Indian tribes had been absorbed into our law.' 5 Under
this rule, the tribes' use and occupancy of their lands is respected, but
they are disabled from selling their lands externally to anyone not acting under authority of the sovereign.1 6 The same dependent relation7
ship authorized Congress to legislate broadly respecting the Indians.'
It was described as imposing on the federal government the duty of
protecting the Indians and their property.' 8 Marshall analogized the
dependent relationship to a common law guardianship over the
tribes. ' 9
Third, the Marshall Court concluded that the parties to the early
Indian treaties intended that the tribes would retain self-government
within the territory reserved to them, subject only to federal authority.2 0 In reaching this conclusion, Marshall relied on the terms of treaties, the general course of federal legislation and Indian treaties, and
the principle of international law that the internal law of conquered
or protectorate territory remains in force until affirmatively superseded by the new sovereign. 2 1 This doctrine has subsequently been
22
applied to tribal lands set aside by unilateral federal action as well.
15. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 746 (1835); Johnson v. McIntosh,
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 584-88 (1823).
16. Two early cases involved transactions occurring under British rule. Mitchel v.
United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711 (1835); Johnson v. McIntosh. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543
(1823). Since 1790, this principle has been codified in successive statutes commonly
known as the Nonintercourse Acts. The present version is codified at 25 U.S.C. § 177
(1976). See generally Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661 (1974);
Joint Tribal Council of the Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (Ist Cir.
1975).
17. This principle is implicit in much of Marshall's language, particularly Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561, and later decisions have depended directly on it.
See, e.g., Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-84 (1977); Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,
384-85 (1886).
18. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 551-52, 556 (1832).
19. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); see also United
States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 374-75 (1886). Later Court decisions extended the
guardianship concept to individual Indians. E.g., United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591,
600-01 (1916); United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432, 437-38 (1903). Recent cases
maintain the concept. E.g., United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 647 n.8 (1977);
McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973).
20. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556, 560-62 (1832). See also United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n,
411 U.S. 164, 168-74 (1973); Quiver v. United States, 241 U.S. 602, 603-06 (1916);
Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556. 568-70
(1883); The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 755 (1867).
21. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556, 560-62 (1832).
22. Both Congress and the executive have treated tribal self-government in Indian
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Fourth, the Marshall Court construed Indian treaties and federal
statutes in favor of federal protection for and self-government by the
tribes. 23 From this principle have evolved several closely related rules
of construction governing the interpretation of federal laws and treaties respecting Indian matters. Consensual agreements are to be interpreted as the Indians would have understood them, 24 ambiguities or
doubts about the meaning of statutory or treaty provisions are to be
resolved in the Indians' favor,2 5 ambiguities are to be construed in favor of Indian reservation self-government as opposed to competing
federal or state authority, 26 and treaties and statutes are to be inter27
preted so as to carry out their protective purpose.
A fifth principle, not specifically articulated by Marshall, was developed in later cases: the reservation to tribes of federally protected
territory is intended for the Indians' economic self-support as well as
their continued self-government. The fish, game, timber, minerals,
waters, and other resources are implicitly reserved with the land itself
to provide a productive economic base for the Indians. 28
country without any distinctions based on the manner in which lands were set aside.
This statement is illustrated by a number of statutes, including 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1162;
25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n, 461-479, 1301-1326; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976). See also 25
C.F.R. pt. 11 (1978); United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914); Donnelly v. United
States, 228 U.S. 243, 268-69 (1913); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 385
(1886); Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 657-59 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977); Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d
1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1975).
23. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 551-52, 555-56, 560-62, 582
(1832).
24. Id. at 551-54; see also Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-31
(1970); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1,
11(1899).
25. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976); Antoine v. Washington, 420
U.S. 194, 199-200 (1975); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174-76
(1973); Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1956); Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United
States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908).
26. Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 99
S. Ct. 740, 753 (1979); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Bryan v.
Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392-93 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411
U.S. 164, 174-75 (1973); United States v. Quiver, 241 U.S. 602 (1916); Ex parte Crow
Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
27. Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504-05 (1973); Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S.
681, 684-85 (1942); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1930); Smith v. McCullough, 270 U.S. 456,463-65 (1926).
28. The Court in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), emphasized the
Indians' "full right" to their lands. Id. at 560-61. In Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9
Pet.) 711 (1835), the Court stated that the Indian "right of occupancy is considered as
sacred as the fee-simple of the whites." Id. at 746. Later cases of importance include Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 405-06 (1968); United States v. Shosone
Tribe, 304 U.S. 11 (1938); Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89
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The Court in recent decisions has sustained each of these principles, 29 and the Oliphant decision depended on the interplay of several
of them.
B.

Tribal Courts and Laws

The Suquamish Tribe, whose criminal jurisdiction was denied in
Oliphant, intended to try the defendants for offenses defined similarly
to those of a common law jurisdiction in a tribunal structured much
like Anglo-American courts.3 0 Most other tribes have adopted legal
machinery resembling that of Anglo-American society. 3 1 The original
legal systems of tribes were, of course, quite different. 32 There were
many causes for the demise of traditional systems, 33 but a major rea-

(1918); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); United States v. Winans, 198
U.S. 371 (1905). See also Pelcyger, The Winters Doctrine and the Greening of the Reservations, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 19 (1977).

29. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Bryan v. Itasca
County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164
(1973).
30. 435 U.S. at 193-94, 211-12; see Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th
Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
3 1.
NAT'L AMERICAN INDIAN CT. JUDGES Ass'N, INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE 7,
11 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NAICJA]. The principal exceptions are the Pueblo
tribes of the southwest. Except for the Hopis, the Pueblo tribes were subject to the dominion of Spain and Mexico for over three centuries before their territory became part
of the United States. They had self-government on their own lands under Spanish rule,
although tribal institutions became modified in certain respects to deal with Spanish authorities. The Pueblos' legal systems which existed at the time of United States' occupation have proved durable and most remain in use, Under those systems most legal disputes are handled directly by the tribes' political authorities; the tribes have established
separate courts only for traffic offenses and a few other matters.
32. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 197; Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71
(1978); W. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES 11-19 (1966); K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY (1941); W. SMITH & J. ROBERTS, ZUNI LAW: A FIELD OF

VALUES (1954); R. STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPIRITS (1975); M. Shepardson, Navajo
Ways in Government, 65 AMER. ANTHRO. ASS'N. 70-117 (1963).
33. United States policy has been to deal with the tribes as autonomous entities having relations directly with the federal government. The tribes retain the right to govern
themselves within tribal territory. But the government has also pursued assorted
schemes intended to induce Indian assimilation into the American melting pot, and toward that end it has imposed specific legal restrictions on the tribes, including the
Courts of Indian Offenses discussed in text accompanying notes 34-45 infra. Assimilation policies have usually been exercised through existing tribal organizations, which
continue their separate status but are reoriented away from their traditional governments.
Original tribal legal systems were also undermined by the economic and cultural dislocations resulting from loss of territory, by permanent realignments generated by the
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son for the adoption of common law courts was the Courts of Indian
Offenses. Beginning in 1883, the Bureau of Indian Affairs established
these courts on some Indian reservations3 4 to undermine the authority
of the traditional chiefs and to provide law and order where tribal systems had deteriorated. 3 5 Because the Bureau appointed and paid the
36
judges and police, it exercised significant influence over the system.
But judges and police were tribal members, so self-government con37
tinued under an imposed structure.
The Indian Reorganization Act of 193438 and other reforms of the
1930's were intended to revitalize tribal self-government. 3 9 The
Courts of Indian Offenses were retained and extended to more reservations. 40 In 1935 the Secretary of the Interior issued a new code for

need to confront the settlers, by the effects of European technology and trade, by missionaries and other private efforts to assimilate the Indians, and by social integration
with non-Indians. See INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNMENT RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN
ADMINISTRATION 757 (1928) [hereinafter cited as the MERIAM REPORT].
34. W. HAGAN, supra note 32, at 104-25; MERIAM REPORT, supra note 33, at 769; F.
PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN CRISIS 208-11 (1976). Hagan states that two-thirds
of the reservations had these courts in 1900, their initial peak period. The Meriam Report mentioned 30 such courts serving less than half the reservations in 1928. The courts
then operated under very general regulations giving them jurisdiction over "misdemeanors" and the civil jurisdiction of a justice of the peace. Id.; HAGAN, supra note 32,
at 110, 173-74. The government began setting up Indian police forces in 1878. Id. at
23-50.
Congress never directly authorized these courts. In United States v. Clapox, 35 F.
575, 577 (D. Ore. 1888), their validity was sustained under the general authority of the
Secretary of the Interior over Indian matters. Congress gave implicit sanction to the
courts beginning in 1888 by appropriating money to pay for them. Oliphant,435 U.S. at
196 n.7; W. HAGAN, supra note 32, at 112; MERIAM REPORT, supranote 33, at 769. Subsequent cases cast some doubt on the rationale of Clapox, see, e.g., Organized Village of
Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 63 (1962), but congressional ratification or acquiescence is
a valid basis for the courts. See Ex parte Wilson, 140 U.S. 575, 576-77 (1891). Congress
also recognized the courts in 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1976).
35. W. HAGAN, supra note 32, at 101-02, 154-57, 179. The substantive rules for
early Courts of Indian Offenses forbade certain Indian dances, polygamy, and the practices of medicine men. See United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575 (D. Ore. 1888); M. PRICE,
LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 139-42 (1973).
36. W. HAGAN, supra note 32, at 104-25, 159, 173.
37. Id. at 97, 113, 161, 174.
38. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1976) (as amended).
39. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 387 (1976) (per curiam).
40. This fact may appear to contradict the prior textual sentence, but in the circumstances of that time, the only realistic alternatives were greater federal court authority
or state jurisdiction. See W. HAGAN, supra note 32, at 150; MERIAM REPORT, supra note
33, at 46-47. The government chose the alternative most consistent with tribal self-government. See also note 43 infra.
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the courts; 41 with minor amendments it remains in force today. 4 2 The
code expressly authorized tribes to establish tribal courts and codes to
supplant the secretarial code and courts. 4 3 Most tribes have established their own judicial systems, 44 using the secretarial code provisions as their point of departure. Consequently, tribal institutions
generally resemble this common antecedent, although many tribal
45
codes substantially augment the secretarial code.
II.

THE DECISION IN OLIPHANT V. SUQUAMISH TRIBE

The Oliphant decision struck down two prosecutions initiated by
the Suquamish Tribe against non-Indian residents of its treaty reservation in Washington. 46 Defendant Oliphant was charged with assaulting a peace officer and resisting arrest, defendant Belgarde with
reckless endangering and damaging tribal property. Both defendants
47
unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus in the federal district court.
41. See 3 Fed. Reg. 952 (1938). This code was much more comprehensive than
earlier regulations, but it eliminated most of the direct prohibitions of traditional tribal
practices. It also restricted criminal jurisdiction to offenses occurring within reservations. See 25 C.F.R. § 11.2(a) (1978). The earlier regulations applied to Indians "belonging to the reservation." M. PRICE, supra note 35, at 141-42.
42. 25 C.F.R. pt. 11 (1978). See also 25 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976) (enacted in 1968 to
provide a model penal code for reservations but not yet carried out).
43. 25 C.F.R. § 11.1(e) (1978). The tribes always had that authority. In fact, the Five
Civilized Tribes had established effective courts and codes during the nineteenth century. See notes 137-47 and accompanying text infra. The Bureau of Indian Affairs
originally assumed that Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) tribes would immediately set
up their own courts, and the 1935 Code was applied only to tribes who rejected the IRA.
Concerning these tribes, see note 179 infra. When IRA tribes did not set up their own
courts, the Bureau extended the code to all tribes. 3 Fed. Reg. 952 (1938).
44. The Oliphant opinion stated that 71 tribes operated tribal courts, while there
were 30 Courts of Indian Offenses. 435 U.S. at 196 n.7. These figures are a bit misleading, however, because virtually all large tribes are in the former group and some courts
in the latter category are operated only for limited purposes.
45. NAICJA, supra note 31, at 36-45, 51-80 (describing current practices of tribal
courts).
46. 435 U.S. at 192-93. The population of the reservation was 2,928 non-Indians,
while only 50 Indians lived there, according to the Court. Id. at 193 n.1. This circumstance resulted from the federal allotment and opening laws which affected many reservations between 1854 and 1934. See notes 124-25 and accompanying text infra. At
Port Madison, 63% of the land was non-Indian owned. Defendants in argument relied
strongly on the reservation's demography and on the fact that non-Indian residents
could not participate in tribal government. The tribe in response argued that it sought
only to punish offenses directly affecting Indians. The Court recited the population figures, but the decision appears by its terms to apply to all reservations, including those
where there are few non-Indians and the tribe owns all the land. See also notes 159-61
and accompanying text infra.
47. 435 U.S. at 194-95. The district court had habeas corpus jurisdiction pursuant
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The court of appeals affirmed in Oliphant's case, one judge dissenting, holding that criminal jurisdiction is included in the tribe's retained sovereignty. 48 The Supreme Court reversed by a vote of six to
tWo.

4 9

The Supreme Court's opinion seemed to approve the court of appeals' statement of the underlying principle that the tribes retain those
sovereign powers not expressly terminated by treaty or statute or "inconsistent with their status. '5 0 The Court in Wheeler v. United States,
decided the same term, specifically relied on this principle. 5 1 Thus,
the reversal was not based on disagreement over the basic concept of

tribal self-government.
A.

Statutory Preemption:An Argument Declined by the Court

The Oliphant Court decided that retained criminal jurisdiction to
try and punish non-Indians is "inconsistent" with the tribes' status. It
sidestepped a closely related argument pressed by defendants that federal statutes had preempted tribal power to punish non-Indians, 52 although the Court did rely on these statutes to support its conclusion
to 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (1976), conferring jurisdiction to test the legality of confinement
under the authority of an Indian tribe. See also Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F.2d 369
(9th Cir. 1965); Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878).
48. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). The dissenting opinion framed the issue
as whether the tribal power "is consistent with the powers granted by Congress to tribal
governments," 544 F.2d at 1014, a formulation that apparently looked for an express
federal grant for all tribal powers. To that extent the dissent differed conceptually from
the Supreme Court majority and from the Court's holding in United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313 (1978). See text accompanying note 53 infra. But the dissent considered
and rejected the possibility of authority based on congressional aquiescence and, in so
doing, cited a number of the factors relied on by the Supreme Court.
49. Justice Rehnquist delivered the Court's opinion. Justice Marshall, joined by
Chief Justice Burger, filed a one paragraph dissent concluding that tribal sovereignty to
try and punish all offenders against tribal law had never been lost or withdrawn. They
relied on the majority opinion of the court of appeals. Justice Brennan did not participate owing to illness. The Court noted that it had granted review of Belgarde's case
while it was still pending in the court of appeals. 435 U.S. at 195 n.5. The Court has jurisdiction to grant such review. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(1), 2101(e) (1977). Its own Rule 20
apparently limits such review to cases of "imperative public importance," but in fact the
Court has granted early review in a number of other cases where an issue identical to
one already before the Court in another case was presented. R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 4.21 (5th ed. 1978).

50. 435 U.S. at 208.
51. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
52. The Court did not directly address that argument, nor did the dissenting judge
in the court of appeals. The court of appeals majority necessarily considered and rejected it. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom.Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
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that the power was implicitly surrendered. 5 3 An examination of this
preemption contention is therefore pertinent.
In 1790 the first Congress included in the first Indian Trade and
Intercourse Act a provision for federal punishment of any crime by
non-Indians against Indians or their property within tribal territory.5 4
Earlier treaties made under the Confederation had similar provisions. 55 In 1817, the general federal enclave law was extended to Indian tribal territory except for crimes by Indians against Indians, and
that scheme has continued to the present for many interracial
crimes. 56 Defendants asked the Court to hold that this comprehensive
and continuous federal jurisdiction preempted tribal authority that
might otherwise exist. One of the authorities on which the Oliphant

53. 435 U.S. at 197 n.8, 201, 208.
54. Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, §§ 5-6, 1 Stat. 137, 138. The provision applied to
offenses by "any citizen or inhabitant of the United States," a phrase that appears
comprehensive but in context clearly did not include Indians. The victim had to be a
"peaceable and friendly Indian;" the offense had to occur within "any town. settlement
or territory" belonging to a tribe. The offense was then punished in federal court according to the substantive law of the state or territorial district to which the defendant
"may belong" applicable to like cases with white victims. The provision was continued
with little change in the Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, §§ 4-5, 1 Stat. 329. 329-30. The Act
of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, §§ 4, 6, 15, 1 Stat. 469, 470-73, added specific penalties but
was otherwise substantially the same. Those sections were continued unchanged in the
Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, §§ 4, 6, 15, 1 Stat. 743, 744-48, and the Act of Mar. 30,
1802, ch. 13, §§ 4, 6, 15, 2 Stat. 139, 141-44. The 1802 Act was the first "permanent"
Indian Trade and Intercourse statute; i.e., it had no automatic expiration date as had the
earlier acts. The cited sections of the 1802 Act were largely superseded by the 1817 Act.
See note 56 and accompanying text infra.
55. Treaty with the Wyandot and Other Tribes, Jan. 9, 1789, art. 5, 7 Stat. 28. 29;
Treaty with the Chickasaw, Jan. 10, 1786, art. 6, 7 Stat. 24, 25; Treaty with the
Cherokee, Nov. 28, 1785, art. 7, 7 Stat. 18, 19.
56. Act of Mar. 3, 1817, ch. 92, 3 Stat. 383. This Act applied to offenses within "any
town, district, or territory" belonging to an Indian tribe. Crimes by Indians against
non-Indians, and by non-Indians against each other, were included. The Act expressly
excluded crimes "by one Indian against another" and also specified that it should not be
construed "to affect any treaty now in force" with any tribe.
The 1834 Indian Trade and Intercourse Act continued the 1817 provision with a few
changes. Act ofJune 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 25, 4 Stat. 729, 733. The territorial application
was changed to "Indian country," a term defined in sections 1 and 24 of the Act, and the
treaty proviso was deleted. Section 29 continued the prior act for tribes residing east of
the Mississippi River. The Act of Mar. 27, 1854, ch. 26, § 3, 10 Stat. 270, added provisos
excluding offenses by Indians already punished under tribal law and excluding offenses
where exclusive jurisdiction was reserved to a tribe by treaty. See notes 85, 86 & 150
and accompanying text infra. The 1854 Act also specified that the applicable substantive laws did not include those passed for the District of Columbia. There have been no
substantive amendments since 1854, but the codifications of 1873 and of the Federal
Criminal Code in 1948 altered the wording. The present section, 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(1976), has not been changed since 1948. This article uses "Indian Country Crimes Act"
as a convenient descriptive term for this statute, reflecting its terms since 1834.
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Court relied was predicated on this line of reasoning,5 7 rather than on
the theory adopted in the Oliphant decision that the federal statutes
58
reflect the lack of retained tribal authority.
There were a number of difficulties with defendants' preemption
argument. The Indian Country Crimes Act was amended in 1854 to
prohibit federal prosecution of an Indian already punished for the
same act under tribal law. 59 That amendment clearly contemplated
concurrent tribal jurisdiction. 60 Defendants pointed to the fact that
the amendment applied only to Indians, an argument the Court relied
on to support the rationale it actually accepted, that the tribes had no
jurisdiction over non-Indians in the first place. But the 1854 amendment made the preemption argument difficult, for it could not succeed unless the pre-1854 statute were fully preemptive and the
amendment created an exception only for offenses by Indians, or if
the pre-1854 statute were preemptive only of jurisdiction over non-Indians. The words of the statute plainly do not support the latter view,
and the former is contrary to the evidence. The event recited in the
legislative history as giving rise to the 1854 amendment was a federal
prosecution of an Indian already punished under tribal law for the
same act, showing that tribes had actually exercised jurisdiction before 1854.61 The legislative history of the 1854 amendment suggests
no congressional disapproval of this tribal jurisdiction, 62 and the legislative history of the 1834 reenactment reflects a congressional understanding that the tribes had concurrent authority with the federal
government. 63 Contemporary federal policy generally supported
64
tribal authority at least over tribe members.
Two other observations lead to the same conclusion. The later
57.
58.
59.

See note 78 and accompanying text infra.
435 U.S. at 201, 208, 211.
See note 56 supra.

60. The Court recognized this in United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 325
(1978).

61.

See 435 U.S. at 203; notes 85 & 86 and accompanying text infra.

62.

The House of Representatives was informed that federal prosecution of a Creek

Indian for a liquor offense already punished by the tribe gave rise to the amendment.
CONG. GLOBE 33d Cong., 1st Sess. 700-01 (1854). See note 86 infra.

63. See H.R. REP. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1834), quoted in Oliphant v.
Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1011 (9th Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). See also id. at 98-100, referring expressly to "concurrent remedies."
64. This is demonstrated by the Indian-against-Indian exception in the Indian
Country Crimes Act, see note 56 supra; by the 1854 double jeopardy exception; by another part of the 1854 Act removing all federal prosecutions of Indians for introducing
liquor into Indian country; and by numerous statements of policy, such as those cited in
note 63 supra.
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Courts of Indian Offenses established by the Interior Department
have consistently exercised concurrent jurisdiction over some offenses
by Indians, showing an administrative understanding that the Indian
Country Crimes Act does not preempt tribal authority. 65 It is also well
established that federal criminal laws do not ordinarily preempt state
criminal jurisdiction over the same acts, so the general presumption is
that Congress does not intend to preempt concurrent criminal juris66
diction.
The evidence thus weighs strongly against the view that the Indian
Country Crimes Act preempted tribal authority. If any doubt remains,
the general rule of construction requires that it be resolved in favor of
retained tribal sovereignty. 67 For these reasons, the Court correctly
68
declined to adopt the preemption argument.
B.

Absence of Retained Tribal Authority: The Rationale Adopted
by the Court

The Court's conclusion that it is implicit in the status of Indian
tribes that they did not retain authority to punish non-Indians was
based on inferences from several sources. As already noted, the Court
relied on the existence of comprehensive federal jurisdiction over the
subject matter. 69 The Court also pointed to the Indians' dependent relationship to the United States, which the Court viewed as inconsistent with retained jurisdiction over non-Indians.7 0 A third basis for
the Court's conclusion was its review of some prior opinions 7 1 and of
65. For a description of these courts, see notes 33-44 and accompanying text supra.
It appears that general misdemeanor jurisdiction of these courts has applied irrespective
of the race of the victim. 25 C.F.R. pt. 11 (1978); W. HAGAN, supra note 32, at 130.
66. See 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1976) (last sentence). See also id. §§ 233, 245, 927. This
principle has been relied on to reject the application of constitutional double jeopardy
between the "separate sovereignties" of the state and federal governments. Abbate v.
United States, 359 U.S. 187, 194 (1959). The same double jeopardy rule applies between Indian tribes and the United States. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313. 33032(1978).
67. See note 26 and accompanying text supra.
68. The Court did not directly refer to the preemption argument. See note 52 supra.
The circumstances imply that the Court declined the argument, but that is not completely certain. The Court's actual rationale is similar and entirely moots the question
as to non-Indian defendants. Preemption would have applied as well to those crimes by
Indians which are subject to federal jurisdiction. See note 56 supra and notes 87-90 &
278 and accompanying text infra.
69. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
70. 435 U.S. at 209-11; see notes 14-19 and accompanying text supra and notes
107-11 and accompanying text infra.
71. See notes 78-84 and accompanying text infra.
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legislative and executive actions apparently reflecting the belief that
such authority did not exist.72 The Court also stressed that until recently few tribes had the governmental machinery necessary to comply with the Anglo-American requirements of due process of law and
presumed that the government intended to guarantee its citizens due
73
process of law within the territorial limits of the United States.
From all those sources the Court concluded that historically the
"commonly shared presumption" 74 was that Indian tribes did not retain authority to try and punish non-Indians within tribal territory.
The Court then examined the particular treaty governing the relationship between the Suquamish Tribe and the United States and concluded that it was consistent with the presumption, so the tribe lacked
75
the authority it had claimed.
The Court's pursuit of the common understanding on the scope of
retained tribal authority is not objectionable in principle. As noted
above, the doctrine of retained tribal sovereignty within tribal territory is based on the Marshall Court's perception of the common understanding of the tribes and the United States in making treaties, and
the Court's construction of the Constitution, statutes, and the law of
nations. No particular statute or treaty stated the rule in so many
words.
The complement of the doctrine of retained tribal jurisdiction is the
exclusion of powers generally understood not to be retained. What is
"generally understood" necessarily includes the understanding of the
Indians as well as the United States, because treaties are consensual
documents. No Indian treaty has ever been construed based on hid76
den or technical meanings known only to the federal negotiators.
The duty of the federal government to protect the Indians requires
that, while searching for a general understanding, the Indians be accorded the benefit of doubts.7 7 But this affects only the clarity of
proof required. The persuasiveness of the Oliphant opinion must depend on whether the historical record is as clear as the Court said it
was:

72. See notes 85-106 and accompanying text infra.
73. 435 U.S. at 210-11.
74. Id. at 196-97, 206.
75. Id. at 206-08 (construing the Treaty of Point Elliott, Jan. 22, 1855, 12 Stat.
927).
76. To the contrary, the accepted rules of construction require that treaties be interpreted as the Indians understood them, see note 24 supra, and that ambiguities be resolved in the Indians' favor, see note 25 supra.
77.

See notes 18 & 19 and accompanying text supra.
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The Oliphant Opinion Examined

The prior expressions of legal opinion relied on by the Court are
thin support for the Oliphant decision. The one judicial precedent
cited, a district court holding in 1878, relied on preemption by the
federal criminal statutes, a position which the Oliphant Court declined to adopt.7 8 Even this preemption rationale was at best an alternative holding.7 9 An 1834 opinion of the Attorney General, which depended primarily on the construction of a particular treaty, based its
78. 435 U.S. at 200 (citing Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878)).
Kenyon involved a prosecution by the Cherokee Nation of Kenyon, a white man, for
larceny of a horse. The court's opinion concluded in one sentence that the Indian court
had no jurisdiction, because "to give this court jurisdiction of the person of an offender.
such offender must be an Indian and the one against whom the offense is committed
must also be an Indian. Rev. St. 1873, § 2146." 14 F. Cas. at 355. The cited statute is
now the Indian-against-Indian exception of 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1976). That reference and
the court's language make it clear that the Kenyon court viewed tribal jurisdiction as
limited by the statute. In its reference to Kenyon, the Oliphantopinion obscured this rationale by quoting the passage above but omitting the part about the victim. Since Indian courts have exercised jurisdiction over interracial and "'victimless" crimes by Indians, the Kenyon view was at least overbroad. The judge who decided Kenyon reached
the same conclusion in Ex parte Morgan, 20 F. 298 (W.D. Ark. 1883), a case not cited
by the Oliphant Court nor in any brief to it. The Morgan opinion makes the court's
preemption view very clear. Id. at 308. The opinion is very doubtful on several issues
beyond the scope of this article.
79. The defendant's race was the second of three grounds for the court's decision in
Ex parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878). The court's first basis was its
conclusion that the alleged offense had been committed outside the territory of the
Cherokee Nation. 14 F. Cas. at 354-55. The third ground was a response to the Cherokees' reliance on the Treaty with the Cherokee Indians, July 19, 1866, 14 Stat. 115. Article 13 agreed to the future establishment of U.S. courts in Cherokee Territory,
provided, that the judicial tribunals of the [Cherokee] nation shall be allowed to
retain exclusive jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases arising within their
country in which members of the nation, by nativity or adoption, shall be the only
parties, or where the cause of action shall arise in the Cherokee nation, except as
otherwise provided in this treaty.
14 Stat. at 119. Kenyon had been an adopted member of the Cherokee Nation, so this
clause was at least relevant. The court concluded, however, that Kenyon had become a
domiciliary of Kansas and ceased to be subject to tribal authority. The court said the
same conclusion would have applied to a member of the Cherokee Nation by blood.
That view was certainly wrong, because the Cherokees claimed that the offense had been
committed in their territory before Kenyon left. In Ex parte Morgan, 20 F. 298, 308
(W.D. Ark. 1883), the court apparently held that treaty clause to be preempted also. Later Supreme Court decisions to the contrary are cited in note 148 infra.
The Oliphant opinion placed great reliance on the Kenyon decision, even giving biographical data about its author, Judge Isaac C. Parker. 435 U.S. at 200 n.10. The apparent reason was to show that Judge Parker was in a position to know what he was talking
about. This part of the Oliphant opinion is peculiar. As stated in note 78 supra, the
Kenyon rationale is not at all certain, and the Court's quote from it is misleading. The
Court does not usually rely very much on lower court decisions. Judge Parker served
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view in large part on the doubtful supposition that concurrent
jurisdiction was
impossible, because a citizen could not have divided
"allegiance."8 0 This divided allegiance argument was rejected by a later Attorney General's opinion sustaining tribal civil jurisdiction over
non-Indians, though the 1834 opinion was favorably mentioned in
passing.8 ' Felix Cohen's 1942 Handbook of Federal Indian Law
stated that jurisdiction to punish non-Indians had not leen allowed by
the federal courts but cited only the 1878 case. 82 A 1970 opinion of
the Interior Solicitor, later withdrawn, also relied entirely on past decisions.8 3 None of these legal opinions articulated the rationale relied
84
on by the OliphantCourt.
The Court relied on inferences drawn from two pieces of legislation
in which Congress addressed criminal jurisdiction only over Indians.
The first, the 1854 amendment to the Indian Country Crimes Act, is
some support for the Court's decision. In reaction to the federal prosecution of an Indian already punished by his tribe, Congress prohibited such double punishment but did not similarly protect nonlong after the formative years, when the basic understanding was established. He also
presided over the eastern portion of the Indian Territory, where the particular treaties
with the Five Civilized Tribes established special jurisdictional rules. See note 50 supra.
One biographer reports that Judge Parker knowingly invaded the jurisdiction of the Indian courts, believing that the Indians should learn from the white man's law. H. CROY,
HE HANGED THEM HIGH 206 (1952), cited in 435 U.S. at 200 n.10. If so, his views were
questionable authority for the Oliphant decision.
Judge Parker's term was not without historical interest, however. He was an incorruptible judge whose jurisdiction suffered much lawless violence. He is said to have sentenced more persons (172) to the gallows than any other American judge, and his court
and gallows are part of a National Historic Site in Fort Smith, Arkansas. See H. CROY,
HE HANGED THEM HIGH 10 (1952); F. HARRINGTON, HANGING JUDGE 58-59 (1951).

80. 2 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 693, 695 (1834), cited in 435 U.S. at 199. The opinion
concerned an alleged offense by a black woman who was the slave of a white resident of
Choctaw country, but their status does not otherwise appear. The opinion interpreted
the Treaty with the Choctaw, Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333. Article 4 indicated the tribe's
understanding that it did not have criminal jurisdiction over white men "who shall come
into their nation." See notes 95 & 145 and accompanying text infra. The opinion assumed that the Indian Country Crimes Act was passed on the premise that tribal jurisdiction did not extend to whites.
81. 7 Op. A-rr'Y GEN. 174, 177-78 (1855). This opinion recognized that concurrent
jurisdiction is unrelated to allegiance and is in fact an ordinary feature of a federal system.
82. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 148 (1942), cited in 435 U.S. at
199 n.9.
83. 77 Interior Dec. 113 (1970) (withdrawn in 1974 without explanation), cited in
435 U.S. at201 n.l1.
84. As noted in text accompanying note 81 supra, the only view similar to the
Court's was expressed in a portion of the 1834 Attorney General's opinion that relied on
supposed problems of"divided allegiance." 2 Op. ATT'Y GEN. 693, 695 (1834).
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Indians. 85 The nature of the amendment, however, does not reflect a
86
deliberative overview of the issue.
Reliance on the second legislative action, the 1885 enactment of
the Indian Major Crimes Act, is perhaps the weakest point in the
Court's reasoning. 87 The Court said that if the 1885 statute were
preemptive of tribal authority, then it would be anomalous that nonIndians were not addressed as well. But the Court declined to find the
statute preemptive, reserving the question, and, instead, acknowledged that the legislative history of that statute expressly favored retained concurrent authority of the tribes. Furthermore, the terms of
the statute which the Court suggested might be preemptive are similar
to terms in the Indian Country Crimes Act,8 8 which the Court declined to hold is preemptive of tribal authority. 89 Actual practice under the 1885 law also raises doubts about its preemptive effect. 90
85. See notes 56 & 62 and accompanying text supra.
86. The amendment was added to a bill concerning the federal courts in Arkansas
in the Senate Indian Affairs Committee, which made no written report. The bill as
amended passed the Senate without discussion or debate. CONG. GLOBE 33d Cong., 1st
Sess. 185, 473, 580-81 (1854). In the House it received no committee review and passed
the full House with a brief explanation reciting as its cause the federal prosecution of a
Creek Indian for a liquor offense after tribal punishment. Id. at 700-01. The Act
repealed federal jurisdiction entirely over that type of offense, and the double jeopardy
wording was inapt and not tied directly to the general Indian Country Crimes provision. We may owe the survival and juxtaposition of the double jeopardy exception as
much to the compilers of the Revised Statutes of 1873. who arranged the words in their
present form, as to the Congress of 1854.
87. 435 U.S. at 203 n.14 (discussing Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385).
The Act provided for federal court punishment of Indians accused of seven named offenses. These have been increased to fourteen by amendment. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242
(1976). See also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 325 n.22 (1978).
88. Both acts refer to the laws applicable to places within the "exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States," which the Court has logically held identifies the laws incorporated.
not the nature of the jurisdiction extended. Ex parte Wilson, 140 U.S. 575 (1891). The
Major Crimes Act also specifies that the offender shall be subject to the same "penalties"
(as well as "laws") as persons committing offenses within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States. But in context and in light of the legislative history, it is more reasonable to interpret this phrase also as an incorporation by reference rather than a preemption.
89. See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
90. The Major Crimes Act was passed about the same time as the Courts of Indian
Offenses were begun. See notes 34-45 and accompanying text supra.The jurisdiction of
the latter has been confined to minor crimes, mostly ones generally categorized as misdemeanors, and tribal courts have followed the same practice. But some of these tribal
offenses punish the same offenses as the Major Crimes Act or punish acts which are
"lesser included offenses" within the latter. E.g., compare 25 C.F.R. § 11.42 (1978)
(theft) with 18 U.S.C. § 661 (1976) (larceny, including petty larceny); see also 25 C.F.R.
§§ 11.39 (assault and battery), 11.75 (attempted rape) (1978). Within one sovereignty,
jeopardy for an included offense will preclude prosecution for the greater crime. Waller
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Thus the Court's argument based on the 1885 statute either begs the
question or is wrong.
A third bill enacted in 1960 included legislative history which tends
to support the Court's conclusion, 9 1 although it is rather distant from
the years in which the basic rules were formulated to be of much significance.92 It is also susceptible to a more neutral interpretation, that
Congress was merely expressing the scope of tribal jurisdiction then
93
being exercised, not the scope of the tribes' full authority.
The Court also cited as support for its decision the pattern of treaty
provisions which addressed the matter of tribal jurisdiction over nonIndians to any degree. Here the decision is on safer ground. The
Court showed that early treaties acknowledged tribal authority to
punish illegal white settlers,9 4 and one treaty included an explicit indication that the tribe knew it needed federal assent to general criminal
v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970). Also, the Court in Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S.
205 (1973), held that a Major Crimes Act defendant has a right to a "lesser included offense" jury instruction, thus invading the traditional field of tribal misdemeanors. See
also M. PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 10- 11 (1973).
Another reality is the reluctance of some federal prosecutors, often located far from
reservations, to prosecute Major Crimes Act cases. See NAICJA, supra note 3 1, at 33.
The tribes thus deal with what are felonies in fact under their own codes of lesser crimes.
Since 1968 federal law has limited tribal punishments to six months imprisonment and a
$500 fine, 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7) (1976), and this limits tribal effectiveness in dealing with
serious crimes or habitual offenders. But sentences for lesser felonies often do not result
in actual time served exceeding six months, and the tribes may be able to impose longer
periods of probation.
It may be argued that the act preempts some tribal penal authority, such as the right to
impose the death penalty. See United States v. Whaley, 37 F. 145 (C.C.S.D. Cal. 1888).
But that sort of preemption applies to the acts of tribal authorities, not to jurisdiction
over defendants in a tribal court, so it does not support the Oliphant rationale.
91. See 435 U.S. at 205-06 (quoting legislative history leading to the enactment of
18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1976)). See also notes 269-71 and accompanying text infra.
92. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 170 (1968).
93. As described in notes 33-45 and accompanying text supra, tribal legal machinery had long been dominated by the Courts of Indian Offenses established by the Interior Department and, at least after 1935, the jurisdiction of those courts clearly applied only to Indian defendants. Tribal courts did not in fact assert jurisdiction over
non-Indians until after 1960. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 196-97 & n.7. Thus the 1960
statements that the tribes did not have jurisdiction over non-Indian trespassers accurately described the scope of tribal authority then being exercised, irrespective of potential authority.
94. 435 U.S. at 197 n.8. Such clauses were common to all treaties made between
1785 and 1795, except for those in New York State. It is doubtful that the clauses survived the later removal treaties under which many of these tribes were moved to the Indian Territory. See notes 142-45 and accompanying text infra. The first treaty to break
the pattern was the Treaty with the Sacs & Foxes, Nov. 3, 1804, 7 Stat. 84. Between
1795 and 1804, all treaties outside New York were with tribes which had previous treaties including illegal settler clauses.
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jurisdiction over whites. 95 Many treaties, including the one construed
in Oliphant, expressly stated that the tribes would turn over offenders
to the United States. 96 Yet the treaty pattern is not as certain an indication of the absence of tribal sovereignty as the Court suggested.
Each treaty is a particular bargain to be separately construed. 97 Some
treaties expressly addressed tribal authority over non-Indians.98 Many
others were silent on the matter of criminal jurisdiction over whites in
tribal territory. 99 Most of the agreements to turn over offenders are
equally consistent with an intent to extradite fugitives, indicating concurrent jurisdiction, as with the Court's inference.100
Another source the Court invoked was the Western Territory Bill,
proposed in 1834 to establish the Indian Territory as a self-governing
territory under a confederation of the tribes. 10 1 That bill, which did
not pass, would have expressly precluded tribal authority to punish
agents of the government, travelers, and others residing among the
102
tribes on government business or pursuant to treaty stipulation.
The legislative history, as the Court noted, viewed that provision as
necessary for the protection of persons for whom the government was
responsible.103 But what the Court does not mention is that illegal
95. 435 U.S. at 197 (citing Treaty with the Choctaws, Sept. 27. 1830, art. 4, 7 Stat.
333). See also note 80 supra.
96. 435 U.S. at 207. These provisions were common from the earliest treaties, e.g.,
Treaty with the Cherokees, Nov. 28, 1785, art. 7. 7 Stat. 18. See 435 U.S. at 197 n.8.
Other treaties included explicit clauses providing that non-Indians who committed offenses against Indians should be delivered up to the United States, and the government
undertook to punish them "in like manner as if the injury had been done to a white
man." Treaty with the Osages, Nov. 10, 1808, art. 9, 7 Stat. 107, 109.
97. E.g., compare Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970), with United
States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926). The Oliphant Court recognized this in its
reference to the illegal settler provisions in early treaties. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
98. E.g., Treaty with the Cherokees, Dec. 29, 1835, art. 5, 7 Stat. 478, 48 1; Treaty
with the Siounes and Oglalas, July 5, 1825, art. 4, 7 Stat. 252, 253.
99. This was true of the Oliphanttreaty except for the agreement to turn over offenders. 435 U.S. at 206; see note 96 and accompanying text supra;note 100 and accompanying text infra.
100. For example, the Treaty with the Sacs & Foxes, Nov. 3, 1804, art. 6,7 Stat. 84,
86, relied on by the Oliphant Court, 435 U.S. at 197 n.8, said that the government
agreed to remove illegal settlers upon the Indians' complaint. Any implication that such
was an exclusive remedy is very weak. In article I of the same treaty the tribes agreed
to the safety of "traders and other persons traveling through their country under the authority of the United States," but nothing was said about illegal settlers.
101. See H.R. REP. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1834), cited in 435 U.S. at 201
n.12; R. SATZ, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE JACKSONIAN ERA 138-42 (1975). The
proposed Western Territory was to include most of what is now Oklahoma, Kansas and
portions of Nebraska, Colorado, and Wyoming. Id. at 14 1.
102. See H.R. REP. No. 474, supra note 101, at 18, quoted in 435 U.S. at 202.
103. Id.

496

Limits on Tribal Jurisdiction
settlers or non-Indians adopted into tribal societies would have been
subject to tribal punishment.' 0 4 They were treated as voluntarily sub10 5
mitting to tribal authority.
Because the Western Territory Bill did not pass, reliance on it for
any purpose is uncertain. There is no indication that any issue relevant to Oliphant caused it to fail, and in any case the bill and its history only support the Court's conclusion with respect to persons
directly under the government's responsibility.10 6 Also, the fact that
Congress proposed to preclude tribal authority over certain non-Indians is equally consistent with the view that these persons were otherwise believed to be under tribal authority.
The Court -viewed the tribes' dependent relationship with the
United States as support for its position. 10 7 As pointed out above, the
treaties commonly expressed the relationship in terms stating that the
tribal party acknowledged itself to be under the protection of the
United States, and Congress undertook to provide that protection by
federal criminal laws.' 08 If the Court meant to read the treaty language as an implied cession or relinquishment of the right to punish
non-Indians under all circumstances, the conclusion is doubtful. In
Worcester v. Georgia the Marshall Court rejected these treaty terms
as a general surrender of self-government and analogized the treaties
to protectorate treaties in Europe between strong and weak states. 10 9
So understood, the dependent relationship supports a partial surren104.

This might be gathered by implication from the provisions just cited; other pas-

sages in the House Report make the intent clear. H.R. REP. No. 474, supra note 101, at
18, 37.
105.

Id.

106. The Court said that the Western Territory Bill "contrasted markedly" with the
lack of similar provisions respecting "other reservations, which frequently bordered
non-Indian settlements." 435 U.S. at 203. This reasoning is based on two erroneous assumptions. First, some treaties had clauses which also reflected the government's recog-

nition that it had particular responsibity for persons lawfully present in tribal territory
as opposed to all non-Indians, drawing the same distinctions as the bill. E.g., Treaty
with the Cherokees, Dec. 29, 1835, art. 5, 7 Stat. 478, 481; Treaty with the Sacs & Foxes,
Nov. 3, 1804, art. 11, 7 Stat. 84, 86. Second, the contemporary policy of the government
was the removal of the tribes to the Indian Territory. Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4

Stat. 411; R. SATZ, supra note 101, ch. 1-4. That policy expressed an abhorrence for reservations which "bordered non-Indian settlements" and sought to eliminate them. See,
e.g., United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whisky, 93 U.S. 188 (1876). The modern
use of the term "Indian reservation" as a place set apart for the Indians dates only to the
1850's. Therefore the Court's conclusion makes sense only if the 1834 bill is contrasted
to events of the 1850's and later, a very weak inference.
107. 435 U.S. at 209-11.
108. See note 14 and accompanying text supra.
109. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560-61 (1832), discussed at notes 20-22 and accompany-

ing text supra.
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der of authority. When powerful states enter into protectorate relationships with weak ones, agents of the former are generally not punishable by the latter. 110 Although the Indians did not know European
international law, the circumstances of the treaties make it reasonable
to assume the Indians' understanding that the soldiers and other
agents of the United States who came among them pursuant to the
treaties would not be subject to their punishments."1 ' To that extent
the Court's inference from the dependent relationship is justified.
Finally, the Court relied on the fact that in 1789 no tribes had governmental structures suited to guarantee an accused person AngloAmerican due process of law before being deprived of life, liberty, or
property. 112 By 1834, when the basic laws were last reenacted, Congress recognized that still only a few tribes had written laws and
courts. 113 As the Court pointed out, the Bill of Rights was a basic
achievement of the Nation's recently obtained independence, and it is
highly unlikely that the United States would allow persons under its
110.

There was (and is) no universal, implicit rule to this effect. See, e.g., J.
THE LAW OF NATIONS 133-34 (6th ed. 1963). Most international agreements
provide for some form of diplomatic immunity for envoys and consuls. Nineteenth century treaties establishing protectorates and other clearly unequal relationships commonly included clauses exempting broader classes of the stronger state's citizens from
the criminal jurisdiction of the weaker state. See, e.g., Convention, Feb. 1, 1858, The
Netherlands-Siak Srie Indrapoera, art. 12, 118 Consol. Treaty Series 293, 299; Treaty,
July 3, 1844, China-United States, art. 21, 8 Stat. 592, 596-97; Treaty, May 7, 1830,
United States-Ottoman Porte, art. 4, 8 Stat. 408, 409; Secretary of State v. Charlesworth, [ 1901] App. Cas. 373 (P.C.). The existence of these clauses suggests a common
understanding on the part of those versed in international law analogous to the Oliphant
Court's finding. The absence of like clauses in Indian treaties gives rise to a competing
argument, but in context the former inference is more compelling. Both in terminology
and in circumstances, the Indian treaties were more unequal than international protectorate treaties. Exemptions from local jurisdiction in international treaties, no matter
how unequal, involve extraterritorial jurisdiction, while tribal territory is within the
United States.
Some international protectorate treaties also included clauses addressing civil jurisdiction. See, e.g., Papayanni v. Russian Steam Nay. & Tr. Co.. 2 Moore, P.C., N.S. 161
(1863). But such clauses were less common than criminal clauses and were less uniform.
Some covered only matters not involving citizens of the weaker state; others addressed only
particular subjects, such as the death of a citizen.
11.
This much can be implied from the treaty language placing the tribes under the
protection of the United States; the officials of the United States were the agents to carry
out that protection. Most treaties were made under sufficiently unequal circumstances
to support the Indians' understanding of the protection clauses.
112. 435 U.S. at 197, 202, 209-11.
113. H.R. REP. No. 474, supra note 101, at 91, quoted in 435 U.S. at 197. The only
two tribes which had then established legal systems similar to the whites' were the Choctaws and the Cherokees, both under the leadership and influence of descendants of intermarried whites. See M. YOUNG, REDSKINS, RUFFLESHIRTS & REDNECKS ch. 1 (1961).
BRIERLY,
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lawful protection and within its borders to be tried and punished without such protections as the rights to trial upon evidence before an independent tribunal, to confrontation of witnesses, and to freedom
from cruel and unusual punishment and arbitrary search and seiz14
ure.1
The Court's dependency and due process analyses are convincing,
particularly the latter. 115 They largely remove the doubts remaining
after considering the Court's other reasons and precedents. The question remains whether the Court's reasoning justified its inclusion of all
non-Indians or should have applied only to persons whose protection
the government may be presumed to have intended. As we shall see,
the early precedents make the decision more doubtful as applied to intruders and to non-Indians who became tribal members.
D.

The Scope of Due Process Protection

The first step toward evaluating the breadth of the Oliphant decision is to look at the federal laws and treaties governing non-Indian
presence in tribal territory. In the early years, the federal policy intended the rigid separation of tribal territory from white settlements.
The treaties reserved the land for the tribes' exclusive use, 11 6 and
early treaties, as already noted, expressly allowed tribal punishment
117
of illegal settlers.
The treaty pattern was supported by statutes. Between 1796 and
1834, it was illegal for non-Indians to enter the treaty lands of the

114. 435 U.S. at 210. The Court itself assumed the absolute worth of due process by
describing present day tribal courts' assimilation of it as demonstrating "dramatic
advances over their historical antecedents." Id.
115.

It might be argued that the due process problem only disabled the tribes from

trying non-Indians because they could not comply with due process protections, a disability that would be removed when they could do so. But it is far-fetched to assume any

such understanding in the context of the early treaties. Also, the Court has held that the
constitutional provisions which by their terms limit the state and federal governments
do not apply to Indian tribes. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). In 1968 Congress imposed some of these limitations
on tribes by statute. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1976); Oliphant,435 U.S. at 195 n.6. See

also notes 241-44 and accompanying text infra.
116. This was the intent behind all the treaties reserving land to tribes, with the possible exception of those after 1854 contemplating allotment. See notes 124 & 125 and
accompanying text infra. The wording varied, but the implication in all was quite clear.

See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174-75 (1973); Treaty
with the Wyandot and Other Indian Tribes, Aug. 3, 1795, art. 5, 7 Stat. 49, 52 (Treaty of
Greeneville).
117.

See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
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powerful southeastern tribes without a federal passport, 118 and federal
law punished several kinds of trespass on all tribal lands. 119 There
was often a wide gap between these laws and their practical enforcement, 12 0 but the legal separation of Indian country was so comprehensive that the Supreme Court in 1832 held that the laws of Georgia
121
had "no force" within Cherokee territory in Georgia.
The 1834 statutory revisions altered the pattern to some extent.
The passport requirement was repealed except for aliens. 122 The
Jackson administration's policy was to move all tribal Indians away
from white settlements, to vacant lands in the West. 123 The dominant
government policy remained one of complete separation, but it now
relied on physical distance as much as legal rules.
After 1845, changing circumstances overtook the early policies.
The United States acquired Texas, New Mexico, California, and Oregon, ending any idea of separating the tribes to the west of a frontier.
In 1854 the government initiated a basic policy of breaking up tribal
lands into individual holdings and trying to assimilate the Indians by
making them into family farmers.1 24 This program, known as the allotment policy, contemplated that some land within tribal territory
would become available for white ownership, either indirectly by sale
125
from individual Indian allottees, or directly from the government.
118. See section 3 of the Indian Trade and Intercourse statutes of 1796, 1799. and
1802, discussed in note 54 supra.
119. E.g., Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, §§ 2, 5, 2 Stat. 139, 141-42.
120. F. PRUCHA, supra note 3, ch. 7.
121. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832).
122. Act ofJune 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 6, 4 Stat. 729, 730. That section was repealed
by the Act of May 21, 1934, ch. 321, 48 Stat. 787.
123. See note 106 supra.
124. Government policy regularly pursued allotment in severalty of tribal lands on
a case-by-case basis beginning with the Treaty with the Ottoes & Missourias, Mar. 15.
1854, art. 6, 10 Stat. 1038, 1039. There were a few earlier examples. Act of Mar. 3,
1839, ch. 83, 5 Stat. 349; Treaty with the Wyandot and Other Indian Tribes, Sept. 29,
1817, 7 Stat. 160. Allotment became the dominant policy for all reservations upon enactment of the General Allotment Act, Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, (codified as amended 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-390 (1976)). Allotting of tribal lands was stopped by
the Indian Reorganization Act, Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, §§ 1-2, 48 Stat. 984,
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-462 (1976)). See generally Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481,
496-97 (1973); F. COHEN, supra note 82, at 63-64, 78-79, 83-84, 206-17.
125. Some treaties provided for allotment of reservations followed by sale of some
or all of the remainder. See, e.g., Treaty with the Kaskaskias, May 30, 1854, arts. 1-4,
10 Stat. 1082, 1082-83, construed in Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 759-61
(1867). The Indian allotments in Kansas were to be subject to such restrictions as the
Secretary of the Interior might impose, Act of Mar. 3, 1859, ch. 82, § 11 I,11 Stat. 430,
and the Secretary made them inalienable. The General Allotment Act and related special acts and agreements provided that the Indian allotments would be held in trust for
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During the period when the allotment policy was pursued, the Suhad no
preme Court held that legal matters within reservations which 126
effect on Indians were subject to state or territorial jurisdiction.
In the early years, the period to which the Oliphant Court looked
to discern its "commonly shared presumption," those persons present
within tribal territory under federal authority included agents of the
government, both civilian and military, licensed traders and missionaries, and travelers lawfully passing through. 12 7 Others were either intruders or persons who joined tribal societies by marriage, adoption,
or other recognition.
A common understanding that tribes could not punish persons in
tribal territory under United States' authority, and that these persons
would be under the government's protection, is consistent with the
available evidence. There is no recorded instance in which a tribe in
the formative years exercised lawful power to punish such persons
either under a treaty provision or otherwise. The proposed 1834
Western Territory Bill and a few treaties which addressed this issue
precluded tribal authority over these persons.' 2 8 The inferences available from international law and due process of law problems make
12 9
the conclusion compelling.
The situation of intruders-persons in tribal territory in violation
of both federal and tribal law-is less certain. The government
showed them much less solicitude. Treaty provisions allowed some
tribes to punish illegal settlers, and federal laws punished illegal
settlers on tribal lands and other trespassers.1 30 The 1834 Western
Territory Bill would have omitted intruders from federal protection, 131 and the inference from international law runs against protection of this class of persons. For these reasons a common under25 years, at which time the Indians would receive patents in fee and could alienate the

land. The Act in sections 5 and 6 also provided for sale to settlers of "surplus" tribal
lands after allotments were made to all tribal families. Other statutes authorized alienation of Indian allotments under various circumstances, the most important of which
was the Act of May 8, 1906, Pub. L. No. 149, 34 Stat. 182 (amending § 6 of the General

Allotment Act) (currently enacted at 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1976)). Tribal lands in Indian
Territory were allotted at the time it was incorporated into Oklahoma under particular
agreements and statutes. See Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413 (1912).
126. E.g., Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898); United States v. McBratney, 104
U.S. 621 (1882). See note 224 and accompanying text infra.
127. These categories are referred to in various treaties, statutes, court opinions
and other sources. See notes 98-106 supra.
128. See notes 10 1-06 and accompanying text supra.
129. See notes 109-14 and accompanying text supra.
130. See notes 94, 117-19 and accompanying text supra.
131. See notes 101-06 and accompanying text supra.
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standing that the tribes were precluded from punishing intruders
found in their territory is not convincingly shown by the sources relied
on by the Court. Resolution of the problem depends on the inferred
intent of the government to guarantee due process of law. If that intent was to include all who did not knowingly waive it by joining
tribal societies, then even intruders should be within the protection.
If, instead, the intent was to protect only persons whose presence the
government authorized, as in the Western Territory Bill, then intruders should not be protected from tribal authority.
One circumstance which supports inclusion of intruders within the
Oliphant holding is the matter of vengeance and retaliation on the
frontier.1 32 Indian tribes were mostly small groups, and relations
among them were governed by the laws of war, which included vengeance and depredations between warring states. Relations between
frontier whites and the tribes were frequently similar. Although private white provocations were often the cause, Indian retaliation was
greatly feared and was often in turn the pretext for violence. From the
beginning, a basic goal of government policy was to suppress revenge,
retaliation, depredations, and the like by both whites and Indians on
the frontier. This is reflected in treaty clauses' 33 and in a number of
provisions of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts.134 There is a
reasonable inference from these sources that control over frontier
raiding was meant to be a federal monopoly.
When considering the third group, non-Indians who became resident members of tribal societies, we first observe, as did the Oliphant
Court, that in the early years most tribal societies were internally regulated by punishments largely different from the fines, lashes, imprisonment, and execution favored by the whites.1 35 Common
methods were social ostracism, ridicule, forced restitution, religious
controls, and banishment. 136 The Oliphantdecision did not mean that
the tribes were unable to apply these measures to non-Indians; the issue was the criminal jurisdiction of tribal courts to try and punish.
132. The Oliphant Court referred briefly to this subject. 435 U.S. at 201.
133. Treaty with the Pawnees, Sept. 30, 1825, art. 5, 7 Stat. 279, 280-81; Treaty
with the Osages, Nov. 10, 1808, art. 9, 7 Stat. 107, 109; Treaty with the Sacs & Foxes.
Nov. 3, 1804, art. 5, 7 Stat. 84, 85-86; Treaty with the Creeks, Aug. 7. 1790, art. 10, 7
Stat. 35, 37.
134. See, e.g., Act of May 19, 1796, ch. 30, §§ 4, 14, 1 Stat. 470, 470-73. Section 16
of the Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729, 73 1-32. is still in force. 18 U.S.C. §
1160 (1976).
135. 435 U.S. at 197. Flogging was a common punishment by local jurisdictions in
the early 19th century, while imprisonment was much less common than today. See H.
BARNES, THE STORY OF PUNISHMENT 55-60, 150, 164 (1930).

136.
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Thus, to evaluate the application of Oliphant to non-Indians
adopted as tribal members, it is necessary to look at situations in
which tribes employed courts and penal sanctions. The earliest reported instances involved the five major tribes moved by the government from the southeast to the Indian Territory. 137 These tribes had
also early adopted whites who intermarried. 138 The 1834 and 1855
opinions of the Attorney General previously discussed arose in Choctaw country. 13 9 The former expressed the view that the tribes would
not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians even if they were tribal members, but, as discussed above, it based that view on the doubt40
ful ground that a citizen could not have divided allegiance.
The Cherokee Nation was one of the first to adopt Anglo-American
courts and punishments, together with formal rules recognizing
adopted whites as tribal members. 14 1 In 1835 the Treaty of New
Echota set the pattern for Cherokee self-government in the Indian
Territory. It supplanted the Cherokees' eastern treaties, which had
earlier recognized the right to punish white intruders. 142 Article 5 of
the 1835 treaty arguably recognized tribal criminal jurisdiction over
adopted, non-Indian members. 143 A later treaty clearly recognized
137. These tribes were the Cherokees, the Creeks and Seminoles, and the Choctaws
and Chickasaws, known from the Anglo-American perspective as the "Five Civilized
Tribes." The paired tribes are distantly related and shared common territory for a time.
See note 145 infra. The first two tribes to establish Anglo-American style courts were
the Choctaws and Cherokees. See note 113 supra.
138. E.g., R. STRICKLAND, FIRE AND THE SPiRITs 49 (1975). Most of the authorities
relied on by the Oliphant Court related to one of these tribes. See notes 62, 78-83 and
accompanying text supra, note 148 infra.
139. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
140. Id.
141. R. STRICKLAND, supra note 138, at 53-72.
142. Treaty with the Cherokees, July 2, 1791, art. 8, 7 Stat. 39, 41; Treaty with the
Cherokees, Nov. 28, 1785, art. 5, 7 Stat. 18, 19. Later treaties prior to removal to the
west reaffirmed these, and the Court in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 553,
556 (1832), viewed them as the principal treaties in force and referred specifically to the
right to punish illegal settlers. In an 1819 treaty the United States undertook to remove
and punish white intruders, although there is no indication that that was meant to supersede the earlier provisions. Convention with the Cherokee Nation, Feb. 27, 1819,
art. 5, 7 Stat. 195, 197.
143. In relevant part, articles 5 and 6 stated:
Article 5. The United States ... shall secure to the Cherokee nation the right by
their national councils to make and carry into effect all such laws as they may deem
necessary for the government and protection of the persons and property within
their own country belonging to their people or such persons as have connected
themselves with them:provided always that they shall not be inconsistent with the
constitution of the United States and such acts of Congress ii have been or may be
passed regulating trade and intercourse with the Indians; and also, that they shall
not be considered as extending to such citizens and army of the United States as
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this right and seemed to assume that the 1835 treaty had included
t44 The
it.
other four tribes had the same right recognized later, as they
too adopted Anglo-American forms of government.' 45 This jurisdicmay travel or reside in the Indian country by permission according to the laws and
regulations established by the Government of the same.
Article 6.... The Cherokees shall ... be protected against interruption and intrusion from citizens of the United States, who may attempt to settle in the country
without their consent; and all such persons shall be removed from the same by order of the President of the United States. But this is not intended to prevent the residence among them of useful farmers mechanics and teachers for the instruction of
Indians according to treaty stipulations.
Treaty with the Cherokees, Dec. 29, 1835, art. 5,6. 7 Stat. 478, 481.
144. The treaty of July 19, 1866, stated:
Article XIII. The Cherokees also agree that a court or courts may be established by
the United States in said Territory, with such jurisdiction and organized in such
manner as may be prescribed by law: Provided, That the judicial tribunals of the
[Cherokee] nation shall be allowed to retain exclusive jurisdiction in all civil and
criminal cases arising within their country in which members of the nation, by nativity or adoption, shall be the only parties, or where the cause of action shall arise
in the Cherokee Nation, except as otherwise provided in this treaty.
Treaty with the Cherokees, July 19, 1866, art. 13, 14 Stat. 799, 803.
145. The Choctaw removal treaty specified self-government for the Choctaws in the
west but made it clear that the tribe understood it did not have jurisdiction over "'any
white man who shall come into their nation, and infringe any of their national regulations." Treaty with the Choctaws, Sept. 30, 1830, art. 4. 7 Stat. 333. 333-34. See note 95
supra. There was no particular reference to non-Indian members, and the quoted language appears to describe visitors. The Creek removal treaty referred to tribal self-government in the west but did not refer to authority over whites or intruders. Treaty with
the Creeks, Mar. 24, 1832, art. 14, 7 Stat. 366, 368. A supplemental treaty with the
Creeks provided for placing removed Seminoles with the Creeks. Agreement with the
Creeks, Feb. 14, 1833, art. 4, 7 Stat. 417, 419. A treaty with the Choctaw and Chickasaw
placed the Chickasaws in Choctaw country. Convention between the Choctaws and
Chickasaws, Jan. 17, 1837, 11 Stat. 573.
The 1855 treaty with the Choctaw and Chickasaw separated the tribes:
Article 7. So far as may be compatible with the Constitution of the United States
and the laws made in pursuance thereof, regulating trade and intercourse with the
Indian tribes, the Choctaws and Chickasaws shall be secured in the unrestricted
right of self-government, and full jurisdiction, over persons and property, within
their respective limits; excepting, however, all persons with their property, who are
not by birth, adoption, or otherwise citizens or members of either the Choctaw or
Chickasaw tribe, and all persons, not being citizens or members of either tribe,
found within their limits, shall be considered intruders, and be removed from, and
kept out of the same, by the United States agent, assisted if necessary by the military, with the following exceptions, viz: such individuals as are now, or may be in
the employment of the government, and their families; those peacefully travelling,
or temporarily sojourning in the country or trading therein, under license from the
proper authority of the United States, and such as may be permitted by the Choctaws or Chickasaws, with the assent of the United States agent, to reside within
their limits, without becoming citizens or members of either of said tribes.
Treaty with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, June 22, 1855, art. 7, 11 Stat. 611, 612. This
provision was reaffirmed by a later treaty with the same tribes. Treaty with the Choctaws and Chickasaws, Apr. 28, 1866, arts. 38, 43, 14 Stat. 769, 779.
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tion was preserved by statutes in 1889 and 1890,146 and abolished
47
only upon the general dismantling of these tribes' courts in 1898.1
Sources recognizing tribal jurisdiction over adopted tribal members, which the Oliphant Court does not mention, 148 could possibly
The Treaty with the Creek and Seminole Tribes, Aug. 7, 1856, II Stat. 699, separated
these tribes. Article 15 of this treaty was very similar to article 7 of the 1855 Choctaw
and Chickasaw treaty quoted supra. This provision was implicitly continued by the
Treaty with the Seminole Indians, Mar. 21, 1866, art. 7, 9, 14 Stat. 755, 758, 760, and
the Treaty with the Creek Indians, June 14, 1866, art. 10, 12, 14 Stat. 785, 788, 790.
Some members of these five tribes had owned slaves before the Civil War. The four
treaties made in 1866 abolished slavery and conferred the rights of tribal members on
freed slaves. See F. COHEN, supra note 82, at 181-82.
A number of other tribes were settled on lands of the five tribes and some became
members for many purposes. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Journeycake, 155 U.S. 196
(1894).
146. The Act of Mar. 1, 1889, ch. 333, 25 Stat. 783, established a federal court in
Indian Territory. Section 5 conferred on the court exclusive original jurisdiction over
seven offenses against federal law defined in the Act except by one Indian against another, and section 6 conferred jurisdiction over civil causes of action except those "between persons of Indian blood only." The exclusive criminal jurisdiction appeared to
invade the treaty jurisdiction over non-Indian members described in the previous note,
and the civil jurisdiction appeared to invade the exclusive civil jurisdiction of the
Cherokee courts. See note 144 supra. But the Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, 26 Stat. 81,
amended or clarified the 1889 Act. It reduced the Indian Territory to its eastern portion
and established the remainder as the Territory of Oklahoma. Sections 29 through 31 altered the 1889 Act in several ways. A proviso to section 30 stated "that the judicial tribunals of the Indian nations shall retain exclusive jurisdiction in all civil and criminal
cases arising in the country in which members of the nation by nativity or by adoption
shall be the only parties." This Act preserved the prior tribal jurisdiction, with the possible exception of causes of action which "arise in the Cherokee Nation." Alberty v.
United States, 162 U.S. 499, 503 (1896).
147. The courts of these tribes were abolished by the Curtis Act. Act of June 28,
1898, ch. 517, § 28, 30 Stat. 495. See F. COHEN, supra note 82, at 429-30. Nonmember
whites over whom the tribes had no criminal jurisdiction had entered tribal territory in
overwhelming numbers, generating severe law and order problems and prompting abolition. R. STRICKLAND, supra note 138, at 175-82. Although there were special laws applicable, this history is additional support for the Court's holding as applied to nonmembers of the tribes.
148. The validity of tribal authority to prosecute non-Indian members was a
necessary premise to the holding in Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 500-05
(1896). See also Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76, 82 (1906); Nofire v.
United States, 164 U.S. 657 (1897); Westmoreland v. United States, 155 U.S. 545, 548
(1895); Ex parte Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107 (1891); G. SHIRLEY, LAW WEST OF FORT SMITH
183 (1961). The Oliphant Court quoted a passage from the Mayfield opinion, 435 U.S:
at 204, which seemed to recognize the understanding that the United States had undertaken to protect non-Indians in tribal territory, thus supporting the Court's due process
rationale. See notes 112-14 and accompanying text supra. The Court also quoted another passage which in isolation might reach non-Indian tribal members but which read
in the context of the full opinion and other cases does not. The Court in United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978), said the tribes have criminal jurisdiction over "tribe
members," but it is doubtful whether the Court intended to refer to the adopted member
question. See note 4 supra.
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be distinguished on the ground that those persons legally became Indians upon adoption, but the Court has several times held to the contrary. 149 The Court might also have said the right depended on express grants, but this is far from clear. The treaties apparently began
to recognize the right as soon as it became relevant to do so. The
situation of non-Indian members prior to the execution of these treaties is unclear, and the common provisions in the early treaties allowing punishment of illegal settlers are at least consistent with the view
that non-Indians who voluntarily joined tribal societies subjected
themselves to tribal laws.' 50 It is thus doubtful that the "commonly
shared presumption" included non-Indian members of the tribes.
Having voluntarily joined tribal societies, the government could assume that they had relinquished their claim to its protection.
The early pattern may be summarized as follows: the tribes had no
authority to punish non-Indians lawfully present in tribal territory under federal authority and protection, jurisdiction over non-Indian
members of tribal societies was extensively exercised by Indian Territory tribes, and the status of intruders was uncertain except under a
few treaties.
E.

The Position of Non-Indian Residents Under the Allotment
Policy

How then do we classify non-Indians who became lawful residents
of reservations under the later allotment policy? Most allotment
149. The leading case is United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 573 (1846).
The Rogers Court left open the "obligations" of non-Indian members to tribal jurisdiction but sustained federal jurisdiction to prosecute them as non-Indians. See also 7 Op.
AT-r'v GEN. 174, 184-85 (1855). The holding respecting federal jurisdiction was
followed in Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 501 (1896), and Westmoreland v.
United States, 155 U.S. 545, 548 (1895).
150. See notes 94, 101-06 supra. Implied support for the contention that an express
grant was needed might be sought in the proviso excepting from federal jurisdiction
"any case where, by treaty stipulation, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or
may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively." 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1976). It is more
likely, however, that the purpose of the proviso was to guarantee exclusive jurisdiction,
rather than to grant any jurisdiction. The proviso was added as part of the Act of Mar.
27, 1854, ch. 26, § 3, 10 Stat. 270, 289. Curiously, there were at that time no treaties explicitly providing for exclusive tribal jurisdiction. But the proviso used specifically fu-

ture language (the original terms were "exclusive jurisdiction may now or hereafter be
secured to said Indian tribes") and treaties with exclusive jurisdiction clauses were
made in 1855 and 1856. See note 145 supra. Concurrent jurisdiction, on the other hand,
had been previously authorized under the illegal settler treaty clauses, see note 94 supra,
and at least by the Cherokees over adopted members, see notes 143 & 149 and accompanying text supra.
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schemes directly contemplated non-Indian settlement within the reservations on what was deemed to be "surplus" Indian land, 15 1 and the
152
resulting integration was an affirmative policy of the government.
For purposes of criminal punishments, these settlers must be classified
with those under federal protection. 153 Some allotment schemes resuited in non-Indian ownership indirectly; Indian allotments were
made alienable and were subsequently acquired by non-Indians. The
same conclusion of federal protection is likely because alienability
was a deliberate policy of the government. 54 Furthermore, the allotment schemes presupposed the eventual withering away of the reservations and tribal authority through assimilation of the Indians, a
view that was not abandoned until 1934.155
The Port Madison Reservation, the site of the Oliphant cases, is
more than half non-Indian-owned as a result of allotment and sale,
56
and the reservation's population is overwhelmingly non-Indian.'
Both defendants were residents as a consequence of the allotment policy. The Suquamish Tribe attempted to base its jurisdiction on the implied consent of non-Indians present on the reservation. 57 For the
reasons already discussed, residents under the allotment policy should
be classified with those under government protection. Therefore tribal
criminal authority over the defendants was properly precluded.
The same reasoning applies to most non-Indians within reservations today. Tribal adoption of resident non-Indians is no longer prac15 1.
152.

See notes 124 & 125 and accompanying text supra.
Mattzv. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481,496 (1973).

153. Their situation was very similar to the blacksmiths, farmers, and teachers who
were to reside among and assist the tribes under the terms of many treaties and who
were clearly under the same protective policy as government agents. See notes 98, 102,
103 & 127 supra;cf. 25 U.S.C. § 48 (1976) (authorizing the Secretary to allow tribes to
supervise such persons). Lawful travelers had generally been treated as under govern-

ment protection anyway, and this would extend to those visiting resident non-Indians.
See notes 100, 102, 118 & 122 and accompanying text supra.

154.

Allotment purchasers were not the direct instruments of government policy in

the same sense as described in the previous note. But the laws allowing sale of allot-

ments generally took effect later than the reservation opening laws, and alienability was
an integral part of the basic assimilation scheme of the allotment laws. After an allotment was taken out of trust, the allottee was made subject to state laws. 25 U.S.C. § 349

(1976). That policy was later reversed within reservations. Moe v. Confederated Salish
& Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 477-79 (1976). It nevertheless suggests an original

understanding that non-Indian purchasers of allotments were an anticipated part of the
allotment scheme.
155. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); Mattz v.
Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973).
156. Oliphant,435 U.S. at 193 n.1, 202 n.13; see note 46 supra.

157.

435 U.S. at 193 n.2.
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ticed,' 58 and most reservations established by agreement with the
tribes have been opened by allotment. Some reservations, especially in
the southwest, were never allotted and opened,15 9 and distinct portions of other reservations were never opened.' 60 On these reservations, a continued tribal right to try and punish non-Indian intruders
was not clearly precluded by the reasoning or precedents of the Oliphant decision.1 61 But the Court's conclusion appears to deny the
authority anyway.
III.

TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY IN NONCRIMINAL
MATTERS

The Oliphant decision established that no tribal court authority exists to punish non-Indians except where Congress grants it. 1 62 Tribal
authority in other than criminal cases, however, was not determined.
The Court was careful to limit its statement of the issue to criminal
matters,' 63 and the opinions in other cases decided the same term
reaffirmed the reasoning of prior cases sustaining tribal civil jurisdic64

tion over non-Indians.1
In most respects the Oliphant Court's rationale does not apply to
noncriminal cases.' 65 As discussed above, an important basis for the
158. One factor discouraging the practice was the enactment in 1888 of an act prohibiting intermarried white men from acquiring rights in tribal property. 25 U.S.C. §
181 (1976).
159. The aridity of some reservations saved them from allotment; in other cases
better functioning tribal economies led to the same result. Both factors were present in
the southwest.
160. See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
161. See also notes 130-34 & 147 and accompanying text supra; notes 194-96 and
accompanying text infra.
162. As discussed in Part 1I-D, the Oliphant rationale applies less certainly to intruders, but the Court's opinion appears to include all non-Indians.
163. 435 U.S. at 195. The Court's opinion included a few comments which taken in
isolation can be cited for or against application of the decision to noncriminal matters.
The Court cited with approval Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904), a leading case
sustaining tribal authority to tax non-Indians within a reservation. 435 U.S. at 206; see
note 186 and accompanying text infra. However, the Court quoted the concurring opinion of Justice Johnson in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87. 147 (1810), to the effect that the tribes lost "the right of governing every person within their limits except
themselves." 435 U.S. at 209. The Court also mentioned civil and criminal jurisdiction
together in a footnote that rejected any relevance of the Indian Civil Rights Act. 435
U.S. at 195 n.6. In the context of the full opinion, none of these references can be taken
as an indication of the Court's view in noncriminal cases.
164. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-24 (1978); Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65-66 (1978).
165. A number of relevant distinctions between civil and criminal matters were
discussed in 7 Op. ArT'y GEN. 174 (1855), cited in 435 U.S. at 199. See note 81 and accompanying text supra.
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decision was the presumed intent of the government to guarantee its
citizens due process of law. This concern has traditionally been less
16 6
important in civil litigation than criminal prosecution.
Federal law has always been less comprehensively involved in civil
than in criminal jurisdiction. In the treaties, the tribes placed themselves under the protection of the United States, and the government
implicitly undertook to provide that protection. This duty of protection was fulfilled by comprehensive criminal laws governing interracial matters. 167 But most civil matters are not within the government's
duty of protection, 168 and Congress has never attempted to supply a
legal system governing civil relationships between Indians and non16 9
Indians in tribal territory.
The denial of tribal criminal authority is thus set against a backdrop of comprehensive federal court authority.17 0 A similar denial of
tribal civil authority would leave most interracial matters to state or,
formerly, territorial law.' 7 ' But federal policy in the formative years
consistently excluded state authority over Indians in tribal territory.' 72 The states were recognized as hostile to the Indians. 73 As the
Supreme Court stated in Rice v. Olson, "The policy of leaving Indians
free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Na166. Civil cases which involve a taking of property come closest to the criminal
punishment situation. See notes 229-30, 247-51 and accompanying text infra;see also
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557-58 (1975).
167. See notes 54 & 56 and accompanying text supra.
168. Two exceptions in the context of the formative years were recompense for violence by whites and control of traders. See note 169 infra.
169. The only provisions in the Indian Trade and Intercourse'Acts were those regulating trade with Indians and the provisions for restitution to Indian victims of crimes.
See notes 54 & 56 supra. In the early years, control of trade was considered necessary to
prevent hostilities, so much so that between 1796 and 1822 the government operated its
own trading houses to supply goods to the Indians. F. PRUCHA, supra note 3, ch. 5. Control of frontier violence by both sides motivated the restitution provision. See notes 131,
133-34 and accompanying text supra. The only more comprehensive system was the jurisdiction given the United States Court for the Indian Territory over some interracial
cases between 1889 and 1907. See note 146 supra.
170. Federal jurisdiction does not, however, extend to offenses by non-Indians
against non-Indians within Indian country in a state. United States v. McBratney, 104
U.S. 621 (1882), cited in United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 644 n.4 (1976). See
note 126 and accompanying text supra;note 224 and accompanying text infra.
171. Absent tribal or federal jurisdiction, state laws generally apply in Indian country. Moe v. Confederated Salish & KootenafTribes, 425 U.S. 463, 474 n.13, 481 n.17
(1976); McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). In the Indian
Territory before 1889, the only civil law systems were those of the tribes, except for the
few cases where the federal district courts had jurisdiction. See note 146 supra.
172. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra.
173. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 385 (1886).
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tion's history."' 74 Thus, the absence of federal statutes governing the
field impairs any inference that the tribes were presumed not to have
civil authority in interracial matters.' 7 5
Finally, as noticed below, tribal authority over non-Indians has
historically been sustained in a variety of circumstances where nonIndians enter into voluntary relationships with Indians.
A.

The Indian Reorganization Act and PriorPrecedents

In 1934 Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). 176
A basic purpose was to revitalize tribal self-government by establishing a framework in federal law for tribal governments under written
codes. 177 Some tribes, especially those which then had better functioning tribal governments, declined to adopt the federal structure, 178
but a majority of tribes chose to operate pursuant to the IRA's govern79
mental provisions.1
The Act specified certain tribal powers but largely relied on the existing, retained sovereignty of the tribes. 180 Like most Indian legislation, the IRA is administered by the Interior Department. Shortly
174. 324 U.S. 786, 789 (1945).
175. Oliphant held that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is inconsistent with
the tribes' dependent status. See note 107 and accompanying text supra. In United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978), the Court identified from its precedents two
other aspects of original tribal sovereignty whose exercise would be inconsistent with
their dependent status. "Indian tribes can no longer freely alienate to non-Indians the
lands they occupy." 435 U.S. at 326; see also notes 15 & 16 and accompanying text supra. Also, Indian tribes "cannot enter into direct commercial or governmental relations
with foreign nations." 435 U.S. at 326. Because these three limitations on tribal sovereignty are based on the tribes' dependent relationship with the federal government, they
do not imply any federal consent to state jurisdiction over Indian country.
176. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479
(1976)).
177. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 383, 387 (1976).
178. The bill which became the Indian Reorganization Act was to apply to all
tribes, but the opposition of many tribal spokesmen led to a section which provided for a
tribal referendum on whether or not to accept the Act. 25 U.S.C. § 478 (1976).
179. A 1947 report stated that 181 tribes accepted the Act, 77 declined it and 14
others came under it because they had not voted. T. HAAs, TEN YEARS OF TRIBAL GovERNMENT UNDER THE IRA (1947). Tribes in Alaska and Oklahoma are governed by special sections, and figures for them are not included. Of those accepting the Act, all but a
few operate pursuant to it. Id.
180. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976). The second paragraph of that section begins: "In addition to all powers vested in any Indian tribe or tribal council by existing law ....
" In
its submission to Congress of the bills which became the IRA, the Interior Department
described these powers as the "right of an Indian tribe to deal with many matters affecting the lives and property of its members." Hearing on S. 2755 Before the Senate
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1934).
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after its enactment, the Department published an opinion detailing
the scope of retained tribal powers and the precedents sustaining
them. 181 The matter was further elaborated in Felix Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law. 182 And the Supreme Court favorably
cited the Interior Department opinion in United States v. Wheeler, in
a context directly relevant to the decision, 18 3 shortly after Oliphant
was decided.
The 1934 Interior opinion is thus an authoritative starting point for
analysis of tribal authority over non-Indians in civil matters. The
opinion dealt with tribal government authority in general, addressing
the particular question of jurisdiction over non-Indians only on some
subjects. Prominent among these were the powers of licensing and
taxation. The opinion concluded that tribes may tax nonmembers "so
far as such nonmembers may accept privileges of trade, residence,
etc., to which taxes may be attached as conditions."' 84 In other
words, the tribes may tax non-Indians within tribal territory who enter into consensual relationships with Indians or who use Indian land.
That rationale includes taxing, licensing, and regulatory authority
over non-Indians who have commercial dealings or contractual relations with Indians, or leases, licenses, contracts or other arrangements
with tribes.
The Interior opinion based its conclusion on a series of decisions
sustaining the authority of the tribes in Indian Territory to impose
taxes and business license fees on non-Indians using tribal land or engaging in trade with Indians.' 8 5 The leading court decisions are Morris v. Hitchcock,186 sustaining a tribal tax on white-owned cattle
87
which were grazed within tribal territory, and Buster v. Wright,'
sustaining a business license fee on white-owned businesses which
traded with Indians within tribal territory. In the latter case the court
said:
The authority of the Creek Nation to prescribe the terms upon
181. 55 Interior Dec. 14 (1934).
182. F. COHEN, supra note 82, at 122-50. The Court has relied on Cohen's work on
many occasions. For example, each of the three major Indian law decisions of the 1977
October term referred to it. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 55; United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322; Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 199 n.9. A revision of Cohen's
work will be published soon. See 25 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1976).
183. 435 U.S. 313, 328 (1978).
184. 55 Interior Dec. 14, 46 (1934).
185. Id. at 46-48.
186. 194 U.S. 384 (1904); see note 163 supra.
187. 135 F. 947 (8th Cir.), appealdismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1905). This decision was
quoted in a brief submitted by the Interior Department to Congress during its consider-
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which noncitizens may transact business within its borders did not
have its origin in act of Congress, treaty, or agreement of the United
States. It was one of the inherent and essential attributes of its original
sovereignty. It was a natural right of that people, indispensable to its
autonomy as a distinct tribe or nation, and it must remain an attribute
of its government until by the agreement of the nation itself or by the
superior power of the republic it is taken from it ...
... It is said that the sale of these lots and the incorporation of cities and towns upon the sites in which the lots are found authorized by
act of Congress to collect taxes for municipal purposes segregated the
town sites and the lots sold from the territory of the Creek Nation, and
deprived it of governmental jurisdiction over this property and over
its occupants. But the jurisdiction to govern the inhabitants of a country is not conditioned or limited by the title to the land which they occupy in it, or by the existence of municipalities therein endowed with
power to collect taxes for city purposes, and to enact and enforce municipal ordinances. Neither the United States, nor a state, nor any
other sovereignty loses the power to govern the people within its borders by the existence of towns and cities therein endowed with the
usual power of municipalities, nor by the ownership nor occupancy of
1 88
the land within its territorial jurisdiction by citizens or foreigners.

Between the 1934 Interior opinion and the Oliphant decision, the
only reported tax cases sustained a tribal tax on non-Indian lessees of
Indian trust lands within the tribe's reservation.' 8 9 Since Oliphant,
several cases have been initiated in which the Oliphant rationale is
raised by the parties opposing the taxes or fees. None has been finally
resolved. A federal court in Arizona refused to extend Oliphant to
preclude taxing jurisdiction over non-Indians. The case involved a tribal possessory interest tax levied on mineral lessees of tribal lands. 190
A federal court in Washington held that the Oliphant rationale precludes all civil as well as criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.1 9 1
Both cases are now on appeal. Other cases involving tribal taxes are
t 92
pending in several courts.
ation of the IRA. Hearings on S. 2755 & 3645 Before the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 269 (1934).
188.
135 F. at 950-52.
189. Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
932 (1958); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
190. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power Dist. v. Navajo Tribe
of Indians, No. 78-352 (D. Ariz. July 11, 1978).
191. Trans-Canada Enterprises, Ltd. v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, No. C77-882M
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 3, 1978). The case involved a tribal license fee.
192. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, Nos. 77-292, 77-343 (D.N.M. Dec. 29.
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The 1934 Interior decision seems consistent with Oliphant and, as
noted, the decision was cited with approval the same term in United
States v. Wheeler.19 3 The importance of fundamental constitutional
considerations is reduced both by the shift from criminal law, where
the greatest protection has traditionally been required, and by the emphasis on consensual relationships voluntarily undertaken. As the Interior decision documents, the precedents support retained tribal civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians in consensual circumstances.
The 1934 Interior opinion also discussed the right of an Indian
tribe to exclude nonmembers from its reservation,1 9 4 concluding as
follows:
Over tribal lands, the tribe has the rights of a landowner as well as
the rights of a local government, dominion as well as sovereignty. But
over all the lands of the reservation, whether owned by the tribe, by
members thereof, or by outsiders, the tribe has the sovereign power of
determining the conditions upon which persons shall be permitted to
enter its domain, to reside therein, and to do business, provided only
such determination is consistent with applicable Federal laws and
does not infringe any vested rights of persons now occupying reservation lands under lawful authority.1 95
The cases on which this part of the opinion relied were basically the
1 96
same as those supporting tribal taxing power discussed above.
The importance of the exclusion right to the issues discussed in this
article is that "the tribe has the sovereign power of determining the
conditions upon which persons shall be permitted to enter its domain,
to reside therein, and to do business." This right is similar in its effect
to the consensual relationship basis discussed above.
B.

Civil Jurisdictionof Tribal Courts
Tribal enforcement of tax, licensing, and regulatory laws is some-

1977), appeal docketed, Nos. 78-1154, 78-1201 (10th Cir. 1978), was decided before
Oliphant. It involves a tribal oil and gas severance tax which the district court held to be
invalid. One ground for the decision was that the tribe had no jurisdiction to tax non-Indians. Snow v. Quinault Indian Nation, No. C77-138T (W.D. Wash. 1977) involves a

tribal business license tax and fee; it is pending in the district court. Confederated
Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 446 F. Supp. 1339 (E.D.
Wash. 1978) (three judge panel), review granted, 99 S. Ct. 1210 (1979) (No. 78-630),
involves a tribal tax on tobacco sales to non-Indian customers; the district court sustained the tax.
193. 435 U.S. 313, 328 (1978).
194. 55 Interior Dec. 14, 49 (1934).
195. Id. at 50.
196. See notes 185-88 and accompanying text supra;see also F. COHEN, supra note
82.
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what restricted by the lack of criminal jurisdiction found in Oliphant.
In the Indian Territory tax and fee cases discussed above, it was further restricted by application of the rule that a tax is generally not a
civil debt collectible in a civil action,' 97 and by congressional abolition of those tribal courts. 198 But the government viewed enforcement
of the taxes as a duty it owed the tribes and enacted an administrative
enforcement system, which was sustained by the federal courts. 199
The cases do not discuss tribal use of the traditional enforcement
methods of liens and property seizures. Where the taxes are valid,
200
these methods should be available.
The 1934 Interior decision concluded that the tribal judicial power
is generally coextensive with legislative and executive, and it said that
the tribes had civil court jurisdiction over an interracial property dispute in the Indian Territory.2 0 ' But the Indian Territory cases arose
under specific laws which recognized exclusive tribal court jurisdiction over cases involving tribal members, whether Indian or not and
in civil as well as criminal cases, and established federal courts with
exclusive jurisdiction in interracial matters. 202 These laws are no longer in force, and there was little other precedent in 1934.
In 1959 the Supreme Court in Williams v. Lee2 0 3 reviewed a state
court's assertion of jurisdiction over an action on a debt filed by a
non-Indian against an Indian couple. The debt arose on a self-governing reservation which had a Court of Indian Offenses. 204 The Supreme Court held that the Indian court had jurisdiction exclusive of
the state court. 205 The Court stated, "It is immaterial that [plaintiff]
is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the transaction with
an Indian took place there ....The cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their
197. Crabtree v. Madden, 54 F. 426 (8th Cir. 1893). But see Barta v. Oglala Sioux
Tribe, 259 F.2d 553, 555-56 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959) (sustainingjurisdiction when the United States sued to collect the tax). Barta, however, involved
a federal district court, while Crabtree arose in proceedings before the U.S. Court for
the Indian Territory.
198. See note 146 supra.
199. Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 954-58 (8th Cir. 1905).
200. Id. at 956.
201. 55 Interior Dec. 14, 56, 62-63 (1934).
202. See note 146 and accompanying text supra; Raymond v. Raymond, 83 F. 721
(8th Cir. 1897).
203. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
204. Id. at 222.
205. Id. See also Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 421 (1971); Hot Oil Service
Co. v. Hall, 366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966); Littell v. Nakai, 344 F.2d 486 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1965).
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reservations. '2 06 Subsequent state and lower court decisions have recognized like principles in tort207 and domestic relations cases, 2 08 and
the Court has indicated that state court jurisdiction is preempted by
federal protection of the tribal right of self-government over tribal reservations. 2 09 In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez the Court stated,
"Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums
for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important personal
21 0
and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians.
Where non-Indians have entered into consensual relationships with
Indians or for the use of Indian land, the historical case for tribal civil
jurisdiction and related tribal legislative authority is quite strong. As
noted above, the authority to tax, license, and regulate has been sustained in those situations. The same reasoning should apply to matters
of domestic relations in instances of intermarriage, 21 1 to contracts,
leases, and agreements concerning the use of Indian land, and other
interracial matters. Torts arising directly out of such relationships
212
should be governed by the same principle.
The important question not settled by authoritative court decisions
is whether and to what extent the tribes may assert civil court jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants when the claim does not arise out of
a consensual relationship. Most tribes had not asserted such authority
except in the Indian Territory, 21 3 but recently some tribes have

206.
207.

358 U.S. at 223.
Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974); Schantz v. White

Lightning, 231 N.W.2d 812 (N.D. 1975); Nelson v. DuBois, 232 N.W.2d 54 (N.D.
1975); Enriquez v. Superior Court, 115 Ariz. 342, 565 P.2d 522 (App. 1977). See also

Kain v. Wilson, 83 S.D. 482, 161 N.W.2d 704 (1968) (claim for wrongful use and possession of land).
208. Wisconsin Potowatomies v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Mich. 1973);
Wakefield v. Little Light, 347 A.2d 722 (Md. 1975); In re Buehl, 87 Wash. 2d 649, 555
P.2d 1334 (1976).

209.

Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976).

210.

436 U.S. 49, 65-66 (1978).

211. One aspect of this area is now the subject of a federal statute allocating jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 1901-1963 (Supp. 1978). See notes 272-77 and accompanying
text infra.
212.

For example, a claim by an Indian customer against a non-Indian trading post

for damages based on the negligent failure to maintain a safe premises should be subject
to tribal authority.
213. See notes 143-50 and accompanying text supra (jurisdiction over non-Indian
tribal members). Many Indian Reorganization Act tribal constitutions expressly provide for authority to exclude nonmembers from tribal land, condition their entry, license their use of property, license businesses, and govern trade. These are consistent
with the powers recognized in 55 Interior Dec. 14 (1934), discussed in Part III-A supra.
The constitutions typically provide for secretarial approval of such tribal ordinances.
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amended their codes to do so. The propriety of such jurisdiction is
discussed in the following section.
C.

Tribal Authority over Non-Indians Not Based on Consensual
Relationships

There are few precedents dealing with tribes seeking to exercise
jurisdiction, legislative or judicial, over non-Indians in matters not
arising out of consensual relationships. The category includes regulatory, tax, and licensing authority over non-Indians using land not
owned by Indians and jurisdiction over torts. As already noted, some
cases have implicitly sustained authority over tort actions against Indians, and these are surely correct.2 14 Also, the court in Buster v.
Wright sustained tribal power to impose a license tax on white-owned
businesses on fee land, but those businesses were trading with Indi5
ans. 21
These issues did not arise in the formative years, making their resolution more difficult. Tribal societies often had a system of forced restitution in lieu of both criminal and tort law, 2 16 and this was imposed
on non-Indian tribal members, but was not suited for resolution of
controversies involving nonmembers. In the early years, most kinds of
tax, regulatory, and licensing laws which we now take for granted
were not yet employed by Anglo-American governments, much less by
2 17
Indian.
The case for tribal jurisdiction has two bases in policy and history.
First, the Supreme Court has clearly accepted the proposition that the
tribes retain so much of their original sovereignty as was not explicitly
taken from them or implicitly surrendered by their submission to federal authority.2 1 8 Although the Oliphant Court found that criminal
law authority over non-Indians was yielded, the reasons for that view
do not apply to civil matters involving or affecting Indians or tribal
property. 21 9 Because the authority has not clearly been taken away, it
should continue.
See, e.g., CONST. OF SHOSHONE-BANNOCK TRIBE OF FORT HALL RESERVATION art. VI, §§
1(i), (1); AMENDED CONST. OF WASHOE TRIBE OF NEVADA & CALIFORNIA art. VI, § 1(f);
CONST. OF FORT BELKNAP INDIAN COMMUNITY art. V, § I(s).
214. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); 25 C.F.R. § 11.22(1978).
215. 135 F. 947, 952-54 (8th Cir. 1905).
216. See W. HAGAN, supra note 33, at 93, 123.
217. The government has, however, always required a license to trade with Indians
in Indian country. See notes 248-52 and accompanying text infra.
218. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1978); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978).
219. See notes 166-74 and accompanying text supra.
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The principal difficulty with this proposition is that, without further analysis, it would seem to establish the right to make laws applicable to the relations of non-Indians with each other in matters of no
direct concern to Indians-for example in tort, contract, or domestic
relations cases where no party is an Indian. Given the great differences between Indian and Anglo-American societies during the early
years, a point emphasized in the Oliphant opinion, 220 the authority to
govern relations of non-Indians with one another seems unlikely to
have been contemplated as part of retained tribal sovereignty.
A more satisfactory analysis begins with the recognition that tribal
sovereignty has a dual nature, relating to certain subject matters as
well as to territory. The two principal subjects of retained sovereignty
are internal self-government 2 21 and economic self-support. 222 Authority over non-Indians is included within those subject areas only in interracial matters. Thus, tribal authority over non-Indians exists only
when there is a direct impact on Indians or their property. 223 The purposes of federal protection of Indians justify the exercise of tribal ju-

risdiction over non-Indians only in these subject areas, not over tribal
territory generally. This view is reflected in a number of statutes and
224
court decisions.
220. 435 U.S. at 197, 201, 210-11.
221. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra.
222. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
223. The Suquamish Tribe had asserted authority over non-Indians only in cases affecting Indians. See Brief for Tribe at 52-56, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 425 U.S.
494 (1978). No tribe has ever sought to assert jurisdiction over non-Indians who were
not tribal members in matters having no direct effect on Indians or the tribe. See note
224 infra.
224. The federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian country reflects a subject matter
as well as territorial scope. The earliest laws applied only to crimes by non-Indians
against Indians. See note 54 supra. The Indian Country Crimes Act excepts crimes by
an Indian against another Indian. See note 56 supra. The Supreme Court has interpreted it to except non-Indian against non-Indian crimes also. See United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 644, n.4 (1977) (citing United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621
(1882)); notes 124 & 170 and accompanying text supra;see also New York ex rel. Ray
v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496, 501 (1946); Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 271-72
(1913); Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
In civil matters the Supreme Court has held that states have jurisdiction over non-Indians in Indian country in matters not affecting Indians or tribes. Montana Catholic
Missions v. Missoula County, 200 U.S. 118, 128-29 (1906); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S.
264 (1898). The test formuated by the Court to determine when state jurisdiction in Indian country is precluded (in the absence of a particular federal statute allocating authority) is whether state jurisdiction interferes with the Indians' right to govern themselves. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 386 (1976); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S.
217, 220 (1959). This test applies to interracial matters. As the Court stated in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission:
[In situations involving Indians and non-Indians], both the tribe and the State

517

Washington Law Review

Vol. 54:479, 1979

The basis for tribal authority over non-Indians is thus distinct from
that for authority over tribal members. Within reservations the tribes
have plenary, direct, and exclusive authority over members except
when expressly limited by federal law. 225 Tribal authority over non-

Indians is retained only where necessary to carry out the purposes of
the reservations, that is, it is derived from authority over Indians and
over tribal property. This instrumental view underlies all prior instances when tribal authority over non-Indians has been recognized or
sustained.
The tribes should retain sufficient authority to carry out these purposes. To deny tribal authority over non-Indians who injure Indians
or whose property is intermingled with Indian property to the extent
that the use of one affects the other would derogate from the purposes
of the reservations. For the tribes to have self-government, they must
be able to govern the relations of their members with others within tribal territory. 22 6 For the tribes to have the full economic use of their
reservations, they must be able to deal with non-Indian practices
substantially affecting tribal property and its uses. 2 27 A related point

supporting tribal authority is that state regulatory laws cannot apply
to tribal lands, 228 so only the tribes can supply a uniform regulatory
system for the intermingled lands in "opened" reservations.
Parties opposing tribal authority have argued that the rationale of
Oliphant should be extended to preclude all tribal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. Both precedent and analysis suggest that argument will
could fairly claim an interest in asserting their respective jurisdictions. The [test of
Williams v. Lee] was designed to resolve this conflict by providing that the State

could protect its interest up to the point where tribal self-government would be af-

fected.
411 U.S. 164, 179 (1963). See also Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 99 S. Ct. 740, 744 n. 1,758-61 (1979).
225. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313 (1978).
226. See notes 203-06 and accompanying text supra.
227. A number of important court decisions have held that express or implied Indian economic and property rights necessary to fulfill the purposes of a reservation prevail over competing non-Indian rights. For example, in Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564, 576 (1908), the Supreme Court held that an implied retention of rights to the
waters of a river was necessary to make a reservation productive. The Court recognized
that non-Indian landowners along the river had great need of the same water but held
that the Indian claim must predominate. See also Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397
U.S. 620 (1970); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 599-601 (1963); Alaska Pacific
Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918); United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371
(1905); Pelcyger, supra note 28.

228. Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir.). cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1975); see Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 388 n.14 (1976);
25 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1978); note 233 infra.
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fail. But in the more specific area of nonconsensual relationships, aspects of the argument have more force. Although the due process protection inferred by the Oliphant Court is most significant in criminal
law, it is nevertheless of importance in those civil cases involving a
possible taking of private property without just compensation.2 29 Indian traditions concerning property, particularly land, are very different from Anglo-American traditions. 2 30 Although non-Indians who

enter into consensual relationships with Indians might justly subject
themselves to tribal authority, those who do not do so should arguably

retain the same implicit protection from tribal authority found in Oliphant. Also, some precedents sustaining tribal jurisdiction have emphasized the consensual relationships involved; 23 1 there is no reported

authority supporting tribal jurisdiction in nonconsensual cases. 232
Another argument made against tribal jurisdiction over non-Indi-

ans is lack of consent of the governed.2 33 The Supreme Court did not
mention this point in deciding Oliphant, and in two prior cases it
expressly rejected arguments of this sort.2 34 But the authority formerly exercised by some tribes over adopted non-Indian members indicates that consent has some relevance to the due process questions

of criminal jurisdiction. 235

229. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). A few treaties
had clauses protecting the property of traders and others. See, e.g., Treaty with the Cheyenne Tribe, July 6, 1825, art. 4, 7 Stat. 255, 255-56; Treaty with the Sacs & Foxes, Nov.
3, 1804, art. 11, 7 Stat. 84, 86-87.
230. This proposition is perhaps most graphically illustrated by the allotment policy
of 1854 to 1934 which sought to induce and compel the Indians to convert their communal lands into family holdings. See note 124 and accompanying text supra. While that
policy succeeded in some individual cases, it was generally recognized as a failure,
showing the tenacity of Indian communal traditions.
231. Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 949 (8th Cir. 1905); 55 Interior Dec. 14, 46
(1934).
232. It must be emphasized that the "consent" is not to jurisdiction over the dispute
itself but to the relationship giving rise to it. Thus non-Indians who become tribal members consent to all tribal authority. See notes 105 & 135-50 and accompanying text supra. Non-Indians who enter into contracts, leases, marriages, or other arrangements
with Indians are subject to tribal authority respecting those arrangements. Non-Indians
who seek to sever the parental rights of Indians and adopt Indian children are subject to
tribal authority pro tanto. See note 211 and accompanying text supra. Non-Indians who
wish to recover damages or other judicial relief from reservation Indians must bring
suit in tribal court and submit to its jurisdiction. See notes 203-09 and accompanying
text supra.
233. See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557-58 (1975); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553, 557 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1958). The Oliphant defendants also raised this point. Brief for Appellant at 111-12, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
234. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557-58 (1975); Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217, 223 (1959).
235. See notes 137-50 and accompanying text supra.
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Tribal jurisdiction in the noncriminal circumstances discussed in
this section does not normally conflict with the reasonable expectations of those subjected to that jurisdiction. Corporations and nonresidents of a reservation have no legitimate expectation of local political
representation. 236 As discussed above, tribal jurisdiction depends on a
consensual relationship between the non-Indian and Indians or the
tribe, a conditional entry into a reservation, or an activity which has a
direct impact on Indians or tribes. Only in the latter category and
when a non-Indian resident of the reservation is involved are normal
expectations of political representation infringed upon. Even in those
cases the infringement is a fairly narrow one, confined to particular
237
circumstances.
The difficulty of the problem in nonconsenual cases is perhaps illustrated by the history of a current case involving regulatory authority over underground water supplies, where salt water intrusion causes
all rights to be interrelated. The court initially issued an opinion sustaining tribal authority, then withdrew it.2 38 The correct analysis
should stress the federal purposes for the reservations by sustaining
tribal authority upon a showing that the non-Indian activity has a direct impact on Indians or their property. The tribes should have authority to pass land use laws for reservation areas where non-Indian
land is substantially intermingled with Indian land, but not where the
land is virtually all non-Indian. Tort authority in interracial cases
should be sustained. 239 Tax authority, aside from the consensual and
exclusionary situations described previously, should be limited to the
imposition of taxes for the support of activities justified by the same

236. Nonresidents or corporations may argue that the general expectation is that all
local residents regardless of race will participate politically. But that is a much more
rarified interest than the right of participation of residents themselves and, in light of the
nature of an Indian reservation, it is hard to sustain as a reasonable expectation.
237. In light of the many special laws and doctrines applicable to Indian reservations, some variation in expectations is implicit in presence within a reservation.
238. United States v. Bel Bay Community and Water Ass'n, No. 303-71C2 (W.D.
Wash., Mar. 3, 1978). Cf. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 460 F. Supp. 1320
(E.D. Wash. 1978) (court held that unrestricted water rights in excess of reserved tribal
rights are subject to state rather than tribal regulation).
239. As noted above, tribal jurisdiction over cases against Indians arising within
tribal territory is exclusive. See notes 205 & 209 and accompanying text supra. In the
reverse situation, actions by Indians against non-Indians, the tribal courts historically
have not asserted jurisdiction, and state court jurisdiction has been sustained. E.g., Paiz
v. Hughes, 76 N.M. 562, 417 P.2d 51 (1966). Whether tribal court jurisdiction in the latter cases would be exclusive or concurrent is uncertain. Most private causes of action
are traditionally transitory, and concurrent jurisdiction is common. But see note 224
supra.
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rationale, that is, where there is a direct impact on Indians or Indian
property.
D.

Effects of Specific FederalStatutes

Tribal authority is specifically limited or confirmed by a number of
federal statutes. The importance of the Indian Reorganization Act in
24 0
strengthening tribal self-government has already been discussed.
The Indian Civil Rights Act, passed in 1968,241 imposed on self-governing tribes many of the limitations which the Constitution imposes
on federal and state governments. 242 In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 243 the Supreme Court held that Congress intended both to
strengthen and to limit tribal self-government through this Act. These
goals were in conflict because the issue was the extent of the enforcement power given to federal courts by the statute. The Court held
that, in light of the legislative history and the tradition of tribal sover244
eignty, federal jurisdiction is limited to habeas corpus.
A statute important to the issues discussed here is the civil jurisdiction part of Public Law 280, which conferred on certain states judicial authority over civil causes of action in Indian country "between
Indians and to which Indians are parties" and provided a mechanism

240. See notes 176-80 and accompanying text supra.
241. 25 U.S.C. § 1301-1303 (1976). The popular name "Indian Civil Rights Act"
is often applied to all of Titles II-VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. E.g., Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 51 (1978). All six titles concerned Indian affairs but
were otherwise only loosely related. The point made here concerns only Title II, which
has been separately called the Indian Bill of Rights. Note, The Indian Bill of Rights and
the ConstitutionalStatus of Tribal Governments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1343 (1969).
242. As noted in note 115 supra, constitutional provisions which by their terms
limit the federal or state governments do not of their own force limit Indian tribes. The
Act guaranteed to persons subject to tribal jurisdiction the right of habeas corpus and
rights taken from amendments 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 14 of the federal Constitution, and it
prohibited bills of attainder and ex post facto laws by tribes. Some rights are set out in
the same terms as the Constitution; others are modified. The most notable omissions are
the establishment clause and the right to appointed counsel in criminal cases. The Act
also limits criminal punishments by tribes to the petty misdemeanor level of 18 U.S.C. §
1 (1976) (a maximum of six months imprisonment and a $500 fine). 25 U.S.C. § 1302(7)
(1976); see also note 90 supra.
243. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
244. The Court indicated that enforcement of the Act would be in tribal courts, 436
U.S. at 65-66, and that in some cases the Secretary of the Interior may have authority to
enforce the Act where tribal legislation requires secretarial approval, 436 U.S. at 66
n.22. Such requirements are common in Indian Reorganization Act constitutions under
25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976), see notes 174-79 and accompanying text supra, and are imposed by some statutes, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1161 (1976).
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for other states to acquire like authority. 24 5 Court decisions have
made it clear that the statute does not apply to tax and regulatory authority; 2 46 it is essentially concerned with private civil actions. The

statute provides that general state laws governing civil actions apply,
and that tribal laws apply in that sphere only when consistent with
247
state law.
Another statutory limitation on tribal authority is the federal control over trading with Indians. Since 1790 federal law has required a
federal license to trade with Indians in Indian country. 248 Since 1882,
the laws have specified that a license is needed by anyone except an
"Indian of the full blood," 24 9 although the persons regulated have in
fact almost all been non-Indians. 250 The federal courts have held that
these statutes are broad in scope, both as to federal authority 251 and
duty. 252 The question here is whether the tribes may tax or regulate li-

censed traders without federal permission. An 1824 opinion of the Attorney General denied the power to tax a licensed trader, 253 and the
1934 Interior Decision discussed above reached the same
conclusion. 25 4 Neither opinion analyzed the point, and the Attorney
General's opinion is based on reasoning since rejected in other contexts. 25 5 It is more consistent with modern preemption law to postulate that the tribes can tax and regulate traders unless the federal pur245. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, Pub. L. No. 83-280, §§ 3-7, 67 Stat. 589-90
(codified, as amended, at 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976)). This act was superseded in part by
the Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 402-406, 82 Stat. 79-80 (codified at
25 U.S.C. §§ 1322-1326 (1976)). See Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of
the Yakima Indian Nation, 99 S. Ct. 740 (1979).
246. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Santa Rosa Band of Indians v.
Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1975).
247. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(c), 25 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1976).
248. See note 55 supra. The current statutes and regulations are at 25 U.S.C. §§ 68,
261-264 (1976) and 25 C.F.R. §§ 251-252 (1978).
249. Act ofJuly 31, 1882, ch. 360, 22 Stat. 179; see 25 U.S.C. § 264 (1976).
250. The early traders laws by their terms applied to any "person" but it is reasonably certain that Indians (at least of the same tribe) were not intended to be regulated.
See note 54 supra.
25 1. Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
252. Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1971).
253.
1 Op. ATT'y GEN. 645 (1824). The opinion relied on the phrase in the Cherokee
treaties giving the United States the "sole and exclusive right" of "managing all their affairs." Id. at 647-48. The Supreme Court gave a different construction to that clause in
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 553-54 (1832), casting doubt on the 1824
opinion.
254. 55 Interior Dec. 14, 48 (1934). No authority was cited except the statutes
themselves.
255. In addition to the treaty point mentioned in note 253 supra, the 1824 opinion
relied on the "power to tax was a power to destroy" argument of McCulloch v. Mary-
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pose of the statutes and regulations is thereby frustrated. 256 Tribal
regulations should be allowed when not inconsistent with the federal
regulatory system, 257 and tribal taxes should be permitted so long as
they do not frustrate the statutory purpose of having goods provided
25 8
to Indian people at reasonable prices.
Federal laws governing allotted lands also limit tribal authority.
These statutes specify that state laws governing heirship and partition
shall apply even to Indians, 2 59 and it is implicit that the tribes cannot
infringe on the basic federal statutory purpose to make land available
in severalty to Indians. 260 Federal law also specifies that under certain
circumstances Indians may sell their allotments. 261 The statutes concerned apply to non-Indians who are heirs of Indians, joint or common owners with them, or purchasers from them.
As previously discussed, the allotment system allowed, and at times
encouraged, non-Indians to become landowners within reservations.
That purpose reduced the exclusively Indian nature of those reservations and altered related tribal power to exclude from the reservation
all nonmembers except agents of the government. 2 62 Purchasers of
those lands are subject to tribal authority only when they enter into
consensual relations with Indians 26 3 or when their activities directly

affect Indians or Indian lands. 264
Liquor control has long been a field of comprehensive federal control over Indian country. From an early date, federal policy mandated
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819). 1 Op. ATT'y GEN. at 650. The scope of that
view of tax immunities has, of course, been considerably modified by subsequent cases.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 391-401 (1978).
256." L. TRIBE, supra note 255, at 376-401. This position is also supported by the
general rule that tribes retain powers not clearly taken by treaty, statute,, or implicitly
lost in their submission to the United States. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,
322-26 (1978). See also Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (plaintiff was a licensed
trader).
257. 25 C.F.R. pt. 252 (1978) provides relatively comprehensive regulations for the
Navajo, Hopi, and Zuni reservations. 25 C.F.R. pt. 251 applies in all other areas of Indian country and arguably leaves many matters to potential tribal authority. Neither
part forbids tribal taxes.
258. See Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567, 571 (9th Cir. 1971).
259. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1976); see id. § 335. Similar sections relate to condemnation,
id. § 357, and mortgage foreclosure, id. § 483a. Other statutes provide for secretarial
control over wills and probate respecting allotted lands. Id. §§ 372-373.
260. Id. § 331 (restricted by id. § 461). The provisions of section 331 did not require
tribal consent.
261. The most important provision is 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1976).
262. See notes 125, 151-57, and accompanying text supra; 55 Interior Dec. 14, 4850.
263. See Parts III-A,--B supra.
264. See Part III-C supra.
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liquor prohibition in tribal territory, 265 and that applied to Indians
and others alike. 2 66 In 1953 Congress authorized the tribes to remove
the federal prohibition laws,2 67 and many tribes have elected to do so.
The 1953 statute gave the tribes broad authority to condition the sale
of liquor in tribal territory, and that authority applies equally to Indi268
ans and non-Indians.
In 1960 Congress enacted a law prohibiting hunting and fishing on
restricted Indian lands without tribal permission.2 6 9 This reinforced
with federal criminal penalties the traditional tribal right to condition
entry onto tribal lands. 2 70 Some tribes have enacted comprehensive
codes for fish and game management, relying on the federal act for
enforcement. These codes have been sustained by the courts, but an
unsettled issue is whether tribal regulation of non-Indians may

265. The Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, § 21, 2 Stat. 146, authorized administrative
control. The Act of May 6, 1822, ch. 58, § 2, 3 Stat. 682, added the power to forefeit the
goods of any trader bringing liquor into Indian country. The Act of July 9, 1832, ch.
174, § 4, 4 Stat. 564, added a general prohibition on introduction of liquor into Indian
country. The Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, §§ 20-21, 4 Stat. 732-33 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1154, 25 U.S.C. § 251 (1976)), added prohibitions on sale to Indians and on operating a distillery in Indian country and provided monetary penalties
for violations. The Act of Feb. 13, 1862, ch. 24, 12 Stat. 338, added imprisonment as a
penalty. The Act of May 25, 1918, ch. 86, 40 Stat. 561, 563 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1156
(1976)), made possession of liquor in Indian country a crime. See also 18 U.S.C. §§
3055, 3113, 3488, 3618-3619; 25 U.S.C. § 253 (1976).
266. Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340 (1908) (Indian defendant); United States
v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1865) (non-Indian defendant). The Act of Mar. 27.
1854, ch. 24, § 3, 10 Stat. 270, 271, repealed application of the introduction and sale
prohibitions to Indian defendants, but that exception was removed in 1862. United
States v. Miller, 105 F. 944 (D. Nev. 1901); United States v. Shaw-Mux, 27 F. Cas.
1049, No. 16,268 (D. Ore. 1873).
267. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 502, § 2, 67 Stat. 586, 586 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1161 (1976)).
268. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975); see United States v. New Mexico, 590 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1978). The statute does not expressly authorize tribal punishment of non-Indians who violate the tribal laws it authorizes, and it conditionally sets
aside a comprehensive federal criminal law scheme. On the other hand, the statute provides for secretarial approval of any tribal ordinance under it, a factor the Court relied
on in Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 558 n. 12, to reject a constitutional challenge by non-Indians.
If the Secretary were to approve a tribal ordinance which included punishment of nonIndian violators, it would likely be valid under Mazurie. No tribe has yet sought that
authority.
269. The statute superseded a more limited provision which had provided a civil
penalty and forfeiture for hunting or trapping by non-Indians on the lands of any treaty
tribe. The latter had been enacted as section 8 of the Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4
Stat. 730. Cf. United States v. Sturgeon, 27 F. Cas. 1357 (D. Nev. 1879) (prosecution of
non-Indians fishing on the reservation of a nontreaty tribe under a provision prohibiting
return to Indian country after lawful removal).
270. See notes 194-96 and accompanying text supra.
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preempt state regulation which interferes with the tribal scheme. 27 '
In 1978 Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act 27 2 in response to growing Indian concern over attempts under state law to
sever the parental rights of Indians and place Indian children in nonIndian adoptive and foster homes. The courts had previously recog3
nized tribal rights to control these matters within reservations, 27 but
cases involving both state and tribal jurisdictional claims had generated no clear rules.27 4 The Act confirms paramount tribal rights over
Indian children who are residents or domiciliaries of a reservation
even if the children are temporarily outside the reservation. 27 5 It also
provides for primary tribal court authority over Indian children residing elsewhere and for full faith and credit for tribal laws in child custody matters. 27 6 In light of the Act's purpose, it clearly includes tribal
authority over any non-Indian who seeks to obtain or retain custody
277
of an Indian child.

E.

TerritorialScope of TribalJurisdiction

The authority of tribes, like that of other governments, is largely
confined to tribal territory. 278 In the early years that was an uncom271. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation v. Washington, 591
F.2d 89 (9th Cir. 1979); Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians v. North Carolina Wildlife
Resources Comm'n, 588 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1978), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W.
3730 (U.S. Apr. 30, 1979) (No. 78-1653); Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531
F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1976); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. New Mexico, No. 77-395-M
(D.N.M. 1977); California v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 424 F. Supp. 969 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
272. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (1978) (to be codified in 25 U.S.C. §§ 19011963 and scattered sections of 28, 42, 43 U.S.C.).
273. See, e.g., Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
274. Compare cases cited at note 208 supra with In re Duryea, 115 Ariz. 86, 563
P.2d 885 (1977); Adoption of Doe, 89 N.M. 606, 555 P.2d 906 (App. 1976); Brokenleg
v. Butts, 559 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W.
3010 (U.S. July 3, 1978) (No. 78-25).
275. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1911 (Supp. 1978).
276. Id. The Act also includes requirements of notice to tribes of the pendency of a
child custody case involving a member, id. § 1913, and of Indian preference in selecting
adoptive parents, id. § 1915.
277. The general purpose of the Act is to assist tribes in keeping Indian children in
Indian homes. Id. § 1902.
278. For example, note the emphasis on boundaries in the basic authority on the
subject, Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), discussed at note 20 and accompanying text supra. Tribes have off-reservation authority over members, but state
laws regulating conduct usually prevail over tribal laws outside reservations, so that tribal authority is limited as a practical matter to such subjects as membership, selection of
officers, use of property, and the like. When tribes have particular off-reservation federal rights, tribal courts have jurisdiction over off-reservation conduct of tribal members. Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974).
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plicated concept, referring to land reserved or granted to tribes by
treaty or law. Tribal ownership within such territory was uniform except for small sites for government buildings, trading posts, and missions. Federal Indian country laws mostly applied to the same territory. 2 79 Tribal and federal authority within tribal boundaries was
uniform and comprehensive. 28 0
Beginning with the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834, the
matter of tribal territory became more complicated. Congress greatly
reduced the complexity in 1948 by statutorily defining Indian country
but did not entirely eliminate it. Also, litigants sometimes try to rely
on precedents under pre- 1948 law. A brief review of the matter is thus
useful.
The Indian Trade and Intercourse Act of 1834 made the principal
territorial term for federal laws "Indian country," which it defined as
all land in Indian title outside the boundaries of the states then existing. 2 81 Congress repealed the section containing this definition in
1874 but retained many laws applicable only in Indian country. 2 82
The Supreme Court was thus compelled to define the term judicially.
It did so by attempting to adjust the 1834 definition to changing conditions.2 83 This approach produced complications until the Court in a
279. The territorial terms of the early Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts were
somewhat imprecise, but the basic terms seem consistent with this statement. See, e.g.,
Act of Mar. 30, 1802, ch. 13, §§ 4-11, 2 Stat. 139, 141-43. Some provisions were particularly concerned with trespasses and depredations along the principal frontier. See, e.g.,
id. §§ 1, 2, 14, 16.
280. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561-62 (1832).
281. Act ofJune 30, 1834, ch. 161, §§ 1, 24, 4 Stat. 729, 729. But section 29 of the
Act included a proviso retaining the earlier 1802 Trade and Intercourse Act for all
tribes residing east of the Mississippi. Also, sections 9 and 11 through 15 of the Act were
not confined to Indian country. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida.
414 U.S. 661, 670-71 (1974); New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761, 771 (1867).
This division is also reflected in the later codifications of these laws. See 25 U.S.C. chs.
5,6(1976).
282. Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 560-62 (1883).
283. Id. The principal case the Court relied on during the 1874-1913 period was
Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877), which generated some confusion and uncertainty in
the law. The events giving rise to Bates occurred prior to the repeal of the 1834 statutory
definition of "Indian country." The Supreme Court decided the case after the repeal but
took no notice of it. The problem addressed by the Court was how to apply the 1834 statutory definition to the greatly changed conditions of the 1870's. Bates involved a liquor
seizure by the Army in Dakota Territory but on land ceded to the United States by the
Indians. Under the imprecise wording of the 1834 definition, it was arguable that all of
Dakota Territory was defined as Indian country regardless of Indian cessions. The
Court sensibly rejected that view and held that ceded lands implicitly ceased to be Indian country. But the Court's opinion said that Indian country consisted of land in
"original" Indian title "unless by the Treaty by which the Indians parted with their title,
or by some Act of Congress, a different rule was made applicable to the case." 95 U.S.
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series of decisions written in 1913 and 1914 shed most of the uncertainties, largely by rejecting the 1834 scheme. 284 One feature of the
1834 definition which survived these decisions, however, was the rule
that land within reservations to which the Indian title had been fully
extinguished was not Indian country. 285 This produced some rather
2 86
absurd results.
The matter was further complicated by other actions of Congress.
In 1882 Congress explicitly added "Indian reservations" to "Indian
287
country" as places in which Indian traders needed a federal license,
and in 1885 Congress passed a law punishing crimes "within any Inat 208. This language was open to the construction that Indian reservations not held in
original title (that is, aboriginal title confirmed by the government) were not Indian
country. There were many reservations of that sort in 1877, and Congress had already
given one indication that Indian reservations might not all be Indian country. Compare
Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, § 10, 4 Stat. 729, 730 (removal of persons from "Indian
country") with Act of June 12, 1858, ch. 155, § 2, 11 Stat. 329, 332 (removal of persons
from "any tribal reservation"). See also notes 287 & 288 infra. In Bates terms, the issue
was whether an act of Congress, treaty, or executive order establishing a reservation had
to specify that it was Indian country, or whether that status was implicit in the nature of
a reservation.
The Bates opinion was also open to the inference that the scheme of section 1 of the
1834 Act confining Indian country to areas outside of any state was implicitly extended
to new states upon their admission absent a statute or treaty provision to the contrary.
The Bates opinion took no notice of section 29 of the 1834 Act and even misstated the
areas east of the Mississippi which were not yet states in 1834, omitting Florida. 95 U.S.
at 207. Again the issue in Bates terms was whether the statute, executive order, or treaty
establishing a reservation within a state, or the state enabling act as to prior reservations, had to specify that the reservation was Indian country or whether that status was
implicit in the nature of a reservation.
284. United States v. Pelican, 232 U.S. 442 (1914); United States v. Sandoval, 231
U.S. 28 (1913); Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913). These cases, and some
laws discussed in them, made it clear that Indian country did not require original Indian
title and that it could exist within a state without an act of Congress so specifying. Their
reasoning had been anticipated by United States v. Leathers, 26 F. Cas. 897 (D. Nev.
1879) and United States v. Bridelman, 7 F. 894 (D. Ore. 1881). See also United States v.
John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978) (reservation land in a state admitted before 1834-Mississippi-is Indian country); United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938) (land purchased by U.S. in trust for Indians is Indian country).
285. The rule was obliquely referred to as late as United States v. Chavez, 290 U.S.
357, 364 (1933) (dictum). It was honored but distinguished in United States v. Soldana,
246 U.S. 530 (1918).
286. The Court in Clairmont v. United States, 225 U.S. 551 (1912), voided a conviction on the ground that the offense occurred on a right-of-way to which the Indian
title had been extinguished. A similar conviction was sustained in United States v. Soldana, 246 U.S. 530 (1918), on the ground that the right-of-way in question was not
owned in fee simple by the grantee. Criminal convictions thus turned on the refinements
of easement law. See Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
287. Act of July 31, 1882, ch. 360, 22 Stat. 179 (now part of 25 U.S.C. § 264
(1976)). See notes 248-50 and accompanying text supra.
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dian reservation." 288 These laws were apparently not confined to land
in Indian title, and the Court so held in 1894.289
The effect of these confusing and inconsistent laws on the territorial scope of tribal self-government is not certain. The only pre-1948
case on point appears to be Buster v. Wright,29 0 in which the court of
appeals sustained tribal taxing authority over non-Indian traders on
fee patented lands within tribal territory, even though that land could
291
not have been Indian country under the contemporary definition.
In 1948 the federal criminal laws were unified by reestablishing
all
one statutory definition of Indian country. That law specifies that 292
ownership.
of
regardless
country
Indian
is
land within a reservation
The Supreme Court has sustained the 1948 scheme in federal criminal cases, to which it applies directly, 2 93 and has applied the definition in cases involving the civil jurisdiction of tribes over their members. 29 4 The Court seems to view the 1948 statute as establishing a
unitary system for most jurisdictional purposes. 295 Subsequent actions
by Congress appear to be based on the same premise. 2 96 The 1948
statute thus established a relatively practical and common sense definition of "Indian country, '2 97 which applies generally to tribal as well
as to federal authority.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's holding in Oliphant is reasonably convincing
288. Act of Mar. 3, 1885, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 385 (codified, as amended, at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1153, 3242 (1976)). This Act applied anywhere in a territory, but only within
reservations in the states. United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 651 n.22 (1978). See also
note 87 and accompanying text supra.
289. United States v. Thomas, 151 U.S. 577 (1894).
290. 135 F. 947 (8th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1905). discussed at note
187 and accompanying text supra.
291. The court specifically discussed the point in 135 F. at 952-54.
292. 18 U.S'C. § 115 1(a) (1976).
293. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
294. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 477-79 (1976);
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975).
295. Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 477-79 (1976);
DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975).
296. In 1953 Congress enacted Public Law 280, a comprehensive statute providing
the principal means for transferring partial jurisdiction over Indian country to the
states. See note 245 and accompanying text supra. The operative term of place in that
law is "Indian country," and the statute applies to civil and tribal jurisdiction as well as
to federal criminal laws. See cases cited at note 246 supra.
297. In United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978), the Court referred to the Bates
definition discussed in note 283 supra, as "more technical and limited" than "the more
expansive scope of the term that was incorporated in the 1948 revision of Title 18." Id.
at 649 n.18.

528

Limits on Tribal Jurisdiction
as applied to persons in tribal territory under federal authority but is
less certainly applied to illegal intruders and is doubtful as to non-Indians who became members of tribes. The Oliphant defendants were
neither intruders nor members, however, so the decision seems correct
in its result. Its application in criminal cases today raises questions
only in the case of tribes retaining the right to exclude intruders from
reservations.
The Oliphant holding aside, the Court's opinion is unsatisfactory in
several respects. The marshaling and use of precedents is selective and
at times inaccurate and misleading. Court decisions should not be
based on a "common understanding" of decisionmakers of more than
a century ago without much more convincing evidence than the Court
had. It is the logic of the Court's reasoning about due process of law,
tribal dependence on federal protection, and the federal criminal statutes which rescues the opinion. If the decision rested on the reconstructed opinions of the formative years alone, it would be questionable indeed.
Indians are a politically impotent minority. It is to Congress' credit
that it has generally sought to deal honorably with them and that its
errors have been founded more on misguided paternalism than on
baser motives. State and private interests have a much less creditable
record, and popular pressures have at times induced Congress to
break faith with the Indians. For any period, records of anti-Indian
views can be collected to support the understanding (or desire and
hope) of many that Indian rights should be swept aside.
Throughout our history the Supreme Court has protected Indians
by requiring that the political will to take their rights be clearly and
certainly expressed.2 98 The Court's approach has been entirely just
and proper in light of the Nation's undertakings in treaties made when
the Indians still had the power to make war. Congress in any case retains the authority to restrict the tribes where it sees the need. Where
there is reasonable doubt, the Court should continue to leave that
duty to Congress.
As discussed in this article, the reasoning of Oliphantas a whole is
not inconsistent with the Court's traditions and precedents in Indian
cases. If that reasoning is applied with other precedents, tribal authority over non-Indians in civil matters should be sustained where necessary to fulfill the purposes of the reservations: tribal self-government
and economic self-support.
298. See Wilkinson & Volkman, JudicialReview of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As
Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the Earth"-How Long a Time Is That?,
63 CALIF. L. REV. 601, 655-61 (1975).
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